Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

Westgate Resorts v. Shaun S. Adel and Consumer
Protection Group, LLC : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
L. Rich Humpherys; Karra J. Porter; Scot A. Boyd; Alain C. Balmanno; Christensen & Jensen.
Micheal D. Zimmerman; Troy L Booher; Christopher L. Stout; Snell & Wilmer; Richard Epstein;
Greenspoon Marder; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Westgate Resorts v. Adel, No. 20101017 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2685

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20101017-SC

SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,
Defendants/Appellant.
APPEAL FROM FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HON. LYNN DAVIS, CIVIL NO. 020404068
DECISION DATED DECEMBER 13, 2010

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

L. Rich Humpherys, 1582
Karra J. Porter, 5223
Scot A. Boyd, 9503
Alain C. Balmanno, 3985
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 -1572
Attorneys for Appellant Consumer
Protection Group, LLC
PILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAY 1 8 2011

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20101017-SC

SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,
Defendants/Appellant.
APPEAL FROM FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HON. LYNN DAVIS, CIVIL NO. 020404068
DECISION DATED DECEMBER 13, 2010

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

L. Rich Humpherys, 1582
Karra J. Porter, 5223
Scot A. Boyd, 9503
Alain C. Balmanno, 3985
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1572
Attorneys for Appellant Consumer
Protection Group, LLC

Michael D. Zimmerman
Troy L. Booher
Christopher L. Stout
SNELL & WILMER, L.L.P.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004
Richard W. Epstein
(admitted pro hac vice)
GREENSPOON MARDER, P.A.
100 West Cypress Creek Road, Suite 700
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee Westgate Resorts, Ltd.
Shaun S. Adel
30 Capobella
Irvine, CA 92614
Defendant

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
All parties to the proceedings in the court below are identified in the caption on
appeal.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT

13

I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL
PURSUANT TO § 129 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT, AND, IN ANY
EVENT, APPEALS PURSUANT TO § 129 ARE PERMISSIVE, NOT
MANDATORY
13

II.

THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL

III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE DISCLOSURE
PROVISIONS OF THE ARBITRATION ACT WAS ERRONEOUS. 18
A.

B.
C.

16

Richard Burbidge's first-cousin relationship with George
Burbidge, without more, was not a "substantial relationship"
with a party
20
The uncontroverted evidence rebutted the presumption of
evident partiality in any event
23
Although the arbitrators all considered themselves neutral and
conducted themselves accordingly after their appointment, Mr.
Burbidge was not a "neutral" appointee under the Arbitration
Act
26

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT A
NON-DISCLOSURE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-11-113(1)
HAD OCCURRED, AND THAT ANY SUCH NON-DISCLOSURE
WOULD MANDATE VACATUR
28

V.

WESTGATE WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO OBJECT TO
ARBITRATOR BURBIDGE'S PARTICIPATION

30

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES ON
APPEAL

34

CONCLUSION

34

ADDENDUM
1.

Trial Court's Ruling (09/30/2010) and Order (12/13/2010)

2.

Transcript of Oral Arguments before Judge Davis (08/04/2010)

3.

Letter on Christensen & Jensen Letterhead to Westgate Resorts Ltd.'s Counsel
(11/26/2008)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Aetna Gas & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A. 2d 88 (R.I. 1991)
29
Astoria Med. Group, v. Health Ins. Plan Greater NY, 182 N.E. 2d 85 (1962)
29
B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc., 754 P. 2d 99
2
Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, 133 P.3d 370
24
Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P. 2d 941 (Utah 1996)
19
Cedar Surgery Center, LLC. v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58; 96 P. 3d 911
17, 18
Clark v. Archer, 2010 UT 57; 242 P. 3d 758
18
Codev.Dept. of Health, 2007 UT 43, 162P.3d 1097
16
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968)
23
Daiichi Hawaii Real Estate Corp. v. Lichter, 82 P. 3d 411 (Hawaii 2003)
29
Davis v. Provo City Corp., 2008 UT 59, 193 P.3d 86
24
DeVore v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1994)
21, 23, 25, 35
Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Savings & Loan Association, 739 P. 2d 1133 (UT
App 1987)
2
Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, 63 P.3d 686
15
Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896P.2d 1230 (Utah App. 1995)
15
Hobet Mining, Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers of America, 877 F.
Supp. 1011 (S.D.W.Va. 1994)
33
Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2008 UT 86; 206 P. 3d 287
16
In re Olympus Const., L.C, 2009 UT 29, 215 P.3d 129
15
Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988)
34
Mahnke v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 565, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197 (2009)
23, 28
Morelite Construction Corp. v. NY City District Council Carpenters Benefit Fund, 748
F.2d 79 (2nd Cir. 1984)
22, 35
Pacific Development, L.C. v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, 23 P. 3d 1035
19
Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54; 982 P. 2d 572
17
Powell v. Cannon, 2008 UT 19; 179 P. 3d 179
14
Pugh v. Dozzo-Hughes, 2005 UT App. 203, 112 P.3d 1247
15
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, 977 P.2d 1201
2
State of Utah v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993)
32
State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, \ 8, 217 P.3d 265
1
Vikrton v. Labor Commission, 2001 UT App 394
32
Washburn v. McManus, 895 F. Supp 392 (D. Conn. 1994)
22, 29

Statutes
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.
Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-10-1602
§ 76-10-1801
§ 78A-3-102
§ 78B-11-112
§ 78B-11-113
§ 78B-11-124
§ 78B-11-126
§ 78B-11-129

6
6
16
28
7, 20, 21, 24, 28, 29, 30
7, 20
35
1, 13, 14, 17, 18

Other Authorities
Richard C. Mangrum & Dee V. Benson, MANGRUM & BENSON ON UTAH EVIDENCE.... 24
Rules
U.R.Civ.P. 54(b)
U.R.Civ.P.63
U.R.E. 301
Utah R. App. P. 10
Utah R. App. P. 3 and 4
Utah R. App. P. 38
Utah R. App. P. 5

13, 18
34
24
15
17
16
16

iv

JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3102(3)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue 1: Is the order from which the petition is brought subject to direct appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78B-11-129 or, does it otherwise constitute a final
judgment for purposes of appeal?
Standard of Review: The interpretation of a statute is a question of law.
State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, If 8, 217 P.3d 265.
Preservation: This issue was raised by this Court in its Order of March 2,
2011, provisionally granting the petition for interlocutory appeal.
Issue 2: Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the order pursuant to Rule 5
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure?
Standard of Review: "[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a
question of law." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ^ 15, 16 P.3d 540.
Preservation: This issue was raised by this Court in its Order of March 2,
2011, provisionally granting the petition for interlocutory appeal.
Issue 3: Did the District Court err in ruling that an undisclosed first-cousin
relationship between Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge, without more, required
vacatur of the arbitration award?

Standard of Review: The interpretation of a statute is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness.

Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, % 17, 977 P.2d

1201.
Preservation: This issue was raised and addressed below in the parties'
briefing at R. 5830-5909, 5916-5982, 6013-6076, and in the trial court's memorandum
decision and order (Exh. 1).
Issue 4: Did the District Court err in failing to deny Westgate's motion to vacate
on grounds of waiver?
Standard of Review: Questions of whether waiver has occurred when
facts are not in material dispute are questions of law. B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v.
Collins Food Service, Inc., 754 P. 2d 99, 101 and Note 1 (Utah Ct. App 1988). Questions
of law are reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, If 17, 977
P.2dl201.
Preservation: This issue was raised and addressed below in the parties'
briefing at R. 5916-5982, 6013-6076, and in the trial court's memorandum decision and
order (Exh. l,p. 8).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113. Disclosure by arbitrator.
(1) Before accepting appointment, an individual who is requested to serve as an
arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, shall disclose to all parties to the
agreement to arbitrate and arbitration proceeding and to any other arbitrators any
known facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the
impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, including:
(a) a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding;
and
2

(b) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the agreement to
arbitrate or the arbitration proceeding, their counsel or representatives, a witness,
or another arbitrator.
(2) An arbitrator has a continuing obligation to disclose to all parties to the
agreement to arbitrate and arbitration proceeding and to any other arbitrators any
facts that the arbitrator leams after accepting appointment which a reasonable
person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator.
(3) If an arbitrator discloses a fact required by Subsection (1) or (2) to be
disclosed and a party timely objects to the appointment or continued service of the
arbitrator based upon the fact disclosed, the objection may be a ground under
Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b) for vacating an award made by the arbitrator.
(4) If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by Subsection (1) or (2),
upon timely objection by a party, the court under Subsection 78B-ll-124(l)(b)
may vacate an award.
(5) An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does not disclose a
known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceeding or
a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party is presumed to act with
evident partiality under Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b).
(6) If the parties to an arbitration proceeding agree to the procedures of an
arbitration organization or any other procedures for challenges to arbitrators before
an award is made, substantial compliance with those procedures is a condition
precedent to a motion to vacate an award on that ground under Subsection 78Bll-124(l)(b).
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124. Vacating an award.
(1) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court
shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(b) there was:
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator;
(ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or
(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the
arbitration proceeding;
(c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient
cause for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy,
or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78B-11-116, so as to
substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
(d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's authority;
(e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the
arbitration proceeding without raising an objection under Subsection 78B-11116(3) not later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or

i

(f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an
arbitration as required in Section 78B-11-110 so as to substantially prejudice the
rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding.
(2) A motion under this section must be filed within 90 days after the movant
receives notice of the award pursuant to Section 78B-11-120 or within 90 days
after the movant receives notice of a modified or corrected award pursuant to
Section 78B-11-121, unless the movant alleges that the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or other undue means, in which case the motion must be made
within 90 days after the ground is known or by the exercise of reasonable care
would have been known by the movant.
(3) If the court vacates an award on a ground other than that set forth in
Subsection (l)(e), it may order a rehearing. If the award is vacated on a ground
stated in Subsection (l)(a) or (b), the rehearing must be before a new arbitrator. If
the award is vacated on a ground stated in Subsection (l)(c), (d), or (f), the
rehearing may be before the arbitrator who made the award or the arbitrator's
successor. The arbitrator must render the decision in the rehearing within the same
time as that provided in Subsection 78B-11-120(2) for an award.
(4) If the court denies a motion to vacate an award, it shall confirm the award
unless a motion to modify or correct the award is pending.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129. Appeals.
(1) An appeal may be taken from:
(a) an order denying a motion to compel arbitration;
(b) an order granting a motion to stay arbitration;
(c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(d) an order modifying or correcting an award;
(e) an order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(f) a final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter.
(2) An appeal under this section must be taken as from an order or a judgment
in a civil action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
Westgate filed its initial lawsuit in this case on September 19, 2002. (R. 0011.) In
March 2004, CPG was granted leave to and did file a counterclaim asserting, inter alia,
claims against Westgate under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (UPUAA). (R.
2755.)
&

Four years later, approximately three months before the UPUAA claims were to
be tried, Westgate filed a motion to compel arbitration of the claims by virtue of a
provision of the UPUAA stating that such claims are "subject to" arbitration. (R. 3057.)
Over CPG's objection, on October 27, 2008, the trial court granted Westgate's motion,
and ordered the UPUAA claims into arbitration. (R. 4718.)
The trial court's order specified a procedure regarding selection of arbitrators (R.
4718), which the parties followed:

Each party first selected an arbitrator. Westgate

selected Judith M. Billings, CPG selected Richard D. (Dick) Burbidge, and the two of
them then selected Paul S. Felt as the neutral. Those three arbitrators comprised the
"Panel." (R. 5954.)
After the appointments, Westgate sent an ex parte communication with material to
its designee. (R. 5922-5924.) Upon learning about it, CPG objected to such ex parte
communications, arguing that communications from parties should be shared with
counsel and all arbitrators. Id.
The Panel, meanwhile, proceeded with the arbitration. On February 20, 2009, the
Panel issued a Pre-Arbitration Order and Hearing Notice, ordering the parties to perform
a number of actions prior to, and to appear at, a pre-arbitration hearing to be held March
27, 2009.

(R. 5955.) At the March hearing, the Panel presented for signature an

"Arbitration Fee Agreement," which included a provision stating that all arbitrators
considered themselves neutral. (R. 5831.)
After a year of discovery and various motions, the arbitration hearing took place
December 7-11, 2009, and January 22, 2010.

On February 2, 2010, the Panel issued unanimous Findings of Facts, Conclusions
of Law and Award ("Arbitration Award"). (R. 5935-5947.) The Panel found by clear
and convincing evidence that Westgate had made false and fraudulent representations,
and non-disclosures with the intent to mislead or with reckless indifference to the truth.
(R. 5942, H 10, R. 5939, % 23.) The Panel also found that the actions of Westgate
constituted a scheme or artifice to defraud within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1801, and that the scheme constituted a pattern of unlawful activity within the
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602. (R. 5942, 10, R. 5941,lj 15.)
The Panel awarded $65,500 on the UPUAA claims.

(R. 5937.)

CPG then

submitted a motion for attorney fees pursuant to UPUAA, and a motion in the District
Court to confirm the first arbitration award and certify it as final under U.R.Civ.P. 54(b).
(R. 5797.) Westgate moved to vacate the award. (R. 5909.)
Westgate's sole objection to the award was that arbitrator Richard Burbidge had
failed to disclose that he is one of 22 first cousins of George W. Burbidge II, a
shareholder at Christensen & Jensen, the law firm representing CPG.

Westgate's

principal argument was that, although Arbitrator Burbidge was a party appointee, by
voluntarily considering himself "neutral" after his appointment, he had subjected himself
to disclosure requirements applicable to arbitrators designated as neutral by statute. (R.
5984-5903.)
Westgate did not claim to have any evidence of actual impropriety by Richard
Burbidge, and the evidence was uncontested that Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge
have no personal or social relationship.

CPG argued that voluntary and/or unilateral characterizations after appointment do
not affect the status of party-appointed arbitrators nor the applicable disclosure standards,
but that, in any event, the mere existence of a first-cousin relationship without more was
insufficient to vacate an award on non-disclosure grounds. Additionally, CPG argued
that Westgate waived its right to seek recusal through its delay in raising its objection
until after the Panel issued its award against Westgate. (R. 5961-5978.)
On December 13, 2010, the District Court entered an order vacating the arbitration
award. The court ruled that the first-cousin relationship in itself was a fact that Richard
Burbidge was required to disclose, because a reasonable person would consider that fact
likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator. (Exh. 1, pp. 7-8.) The Trial Court
concluded that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-ll-113(l)(b) mandated disclosure, and that
evident partiality was presumed under § 78B-11-113(5).

The Court vacated the

arbitration award under § 78B-ll-124(l)(b)(i) and (iii). Id. at 8. Because the trial court
vacated the award, CPG's motion to confirm was rendered moot. As acknowledged by
all parties, under the trial court's order, the matter in arbitration is to be reheard by a new
panel of arbitrators. (See pp. 13-14, infra.)
CPG petitioned for permission to appeal from the trial court's order on December
22, 2010. The Court granted the petition provisionally, directing the parties to address
two threshold issues in connection with briefing on the merits, 1) whether the order from
which the petition is brought is subject to direct appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78B-11-129 or otherwise constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal; and 2)
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whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the order pursuant to Rule 5 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Facts
The following facts were uncontroverted below (R. 5979-5980; see also R. 5982
(CPG's Opposition to Westgate's Motion to Vacate), and R. 6076 (Westgate's Reply)):
Richard D. Burbidge is a first cousin of George W. Burbidge II, one
of 22 first cousins.
[George W. Burbidge is] a shareholder in Christensen & Jensen.
Due to a large disparity in ages between their fathers, Richard D.
Burbidge is a generation older than George W. Burbidge. (Richard D.
Burbidge is 61 years old; George W. Burbidge II is 42.)
Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge have no close familial
relationship, have no active social relationship, do not speak with each
other regularly, have no business relationship with each other, and have no
personal connection outside their familial relationship. They have not
spoken in many months. They last spoke for a minute when they happened
to bump into each other during the Utah Bar Convention in Sun Valley,
Idaho, in June, 2009. Previously, they both attended the funeral of an aunt
in March, 2009.
The law firms at which Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge are
associated have been adverse to each other in litigation, and Richard
Burbidge and George Burbidge have been adverse to each other in
litigation.
George Burbidge has had no involvement in the Westgate case. His
financial interest in any recovery by other shareholders in the firm is
indirect.
George Burbidge has never asked for, discussed, received, or
expected in any way any financial support or benefit from any of his 22
first cousins, including Richard Burbidge. The notion that Richard
Burbidge would be influenced by an indirect interest in facilitating George
Burbidge's indirect interest in a recovery, or vice versa, is unreasonable.

8

Westgate does not claim that any actual conflict existed on the part of Richard D.
Burbidge, or that he evidenced any partiality in the proceedings.1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's order is not subject to immediate appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-11-129. None of the grounds specified by statute for such an appeal is
present: The order did not deny a motion to compel arbitration, did not stay arbitration,
did not modify or correct an award, and was not a final judgment. While the order
technically resulted in a denial of confirmation, as the trial court recognized, that was
solely a result of the order having already been vacated through the granting of
Westgate's motion - in essence, there was no award to confirm. Under § 129(e), appeal
from an order of vacatur is expressly not permitted if the vacatur contemplates a
rehearing, as all parties agree occurred in this case.
Even if one of the grounds for appeal under § 129 had been present, the statute
indicates that the taking of such appeal is permissive, rather than mandatory. This Court

Westgate counsel: "We've never made an accusation that Mr. Burbidge did anything
untoward in connection with discharging his duties as an arbitrator, other than failing to
make these disclosures. Again, as the Court pointed out in its synopsis of the - of CPG's
position, we've never used the undue means or fraud trigger under the - under Section
125. We've never brought that up. That's not part of it. The only one that we've
invoked is the evident partiality. That is only because in Section 113 the presumption of
evident partiality is created by the failure to make that disclosure. So we've never
professed, and we agreed to this in the reply, that we're making a factual showing that
Mr. Burbidge engaged in fraud or undue means or there was evident partiality as a matter
of objective evidence or proof. We've not pointed to anything he said or did during the
proceedings or anything like that." (Exh. 2, Transcript of Hearing, August 4, 2010, pp.
30-31.)

9

has consistently recognized a distinction between permissive ("may" appeal) and
mandatory language ("shall"). Thus, CPG would not have been required to pursue an
appeal pursuant to § 129; it was permitted to seek review through other permissible
means, such as a petition for interlocutory review.
The Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 5; the petition was filed within 20 days of a non-final order. Moreover, even if
the rules governing the filing of a notice of appeal from a final judgment had been
applicable, the filing of the Rule 5 petition less than 30 days after entry of the order
would have had the effect of such a notice under U.R.A.P. 3 and 4. Cedar Surgery
Center, LLC v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58,ffi[10-12, 96 P.3d 91L
With respect to the merits, the trial court erred in its interpretation of the
disclosure requirements of the Utah Arbitration Act. Under the Act, "neutral" arbitrators
are subject to certain disclosure requirements that do not apply to "party" appointees.
Assuming for purposes of argument that Richard D. Burbidge was a neutral rather than
party appointee, the trial court erred in two respects:
First, the court erred in ruling that a first-cousin relationship between an arbitrator
and an attorney whose firm represents one of the parties - 19 years apart in age, with no
existing personal, social, or financial relationship - is, without more, a "substantial
relationship with a party." The trial court's ruling misreads the statute, which requires
disclosure not of "relationships" but only of "substantial" relationships.
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Further, even if the genetic relationship alone could be deemed a substantial
relationship, under the statute, the non-disclosure of such relationship does not mandate
vacatur, as the trial court "reluctantly" believed. Rather, the statute provides only that
non-disclosure creates a "presumption" of "evident partiality." There is no indication in
the statute that the presumption is irrebuttable - indeed, had the legislature so intended, it
would simply have included non-disclosure to the list of grounds for automatic vacatur.
In this case, the presumption was uncontrovertibly rebutted: Evidence of the lack
of any partiality, "evident" or otherwise, and of the lack of any meaningful relationship at
all, was undisputed. Westgate conceded as much, acknowledging that its sole argument
for vacatur was that the presumption was irrebuttable.
The trial court not only erred in interpreting the disclosure standard applicable to
neutral appointees, but it erred in applying that standard in the first instance, because
Mr. Burbidge was a party appointee, not a neutral appointee. By order of the trial court
(and custom), each party selected one arbitrator, and those two arbitrators then appointed
a neutral. Mr. Burbidge was a party appointee, and both the Arbitration Act and case law
distinguish between such appointees and a designated neutral. The fact that, after the
arbitration process had already begun, the Panel unilaterally considered themselves
neutral does not retroactively alter the nature of the appointment.
As a party appointee, Mr. Burbidge was required to disclose only relationships that
"a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator . . .
." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1) (emphasis added). No such relationship exists here
between Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge - indeed, their "relationship" is
11

markedly less developed than that between many unrelated attorneys. Moreover, even if
their relationship was deemed to qualify under Section 113, vacatur was discretionary,
not mandatory, as the trial court assumed.

Under the undisputed facts of this case,

vacatur would not have been a reasonable exercise of discretion even if the trial court had
applied the correct standard.
Finally, the trial court should have considered CPG's argument that Westgate
waived any right to object to Mr. Burbidge's participation or non-disclosures. Westgate
itself admits that the only information it needed to discern the familial relationship was,
literally, staring it in the face: the name of George Burbidge on Christensen & Jensen's
letterhead. That name was on C & J's letterhead throughout the litigation and, in fact, the
designation of Richard Burbidge had been submitted to Westgate's counsel on that same
letterhead two years earlier. Waiver is a permitted argument under the Arbitration Act,
and includes circumstances in which a party fails to act reasonably after actual or
constructive knowledge of its grounds. Even assuming that Westgate did fortuitously
notice George Burbidge's name for the first time shortly after an adverse ruling, the
information was available to it the whole time.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL
PURSUANT TO § 129 OF THE ARBITRATION ACT, AND, IN ANY
EVENT, APPEALS PURSUANT TO § 129 ARE PERMISSIVE, NOT
MANDATORY.
Utah Code Ann. §78B-11-129 provides that an appeal may be taken from: "(a)

an

order denying a motion to compel arbitration; (b) an order granting a motion to stay
arbitration; (c) an order confirming or denying confirmation of an award; (d) an order
modifying or correcting an award; (e) an order vacating an award without directing a
rehearing; or (f) a final judgment entered pursuant to this chapter."
None of the bases for appeal listed in §129 is applicable to this matter. The Ruling
and subsequent Order did not deny a motion to compel arbitration, stay arbitration, or
modify or correct the award. The trial court observed that if it granted the motion to
vacate, it was not required to issue an order confirming the award - there was, in fact, no
award to confirm. (Exh. 1 at 7.) The trial court then granted Westgate's motion to vacate
and denied CPG's combined motion to confirm the award and to enter a final order under
U.R.Civ.P. 54(b). (Id. at 8.) The trial court did not issue a final judgment, and denied
CPG's motion to certify the Order as final under LLR.Civ.P. 54(b). Id.
The parties and the trial court agree that the arbitration is to be reheard by a new
panel unless this Court reverses the trial court's Order. As acknowledged by Westgate in
its opposition to CPG's petition for interlocutory appeal, "The Order calls for rearbitration of the case." Response in Opposition to Petition for Permission to Appeal
from Interlocutory Appeal at 7; see also id. at 8, 9 ("CPG's right to arbitrate its case in

front of a neutral and impartial panel is unaffected"), and 10 ("the District Court's Order,
which in the jargon, ordered a 'do-over'"), and Petition for Permission to Appeal from
Interlocutory Order, pp. 4, 6, 15 ("Unless interlocutory review is granted, the parties will
be forced to start over in an arbitration that has already cost hundreds of thousands of
dollars."); also Exh. 2, Transcript of Hearing p. 34 ("[Westgate counsel]: What the
statute says, though, is if you do vacate for evident impartiality, you order a rehearing.
THE COURT: Sure.") Because the trial court and both parties contemplate a rehearing
of the arbitration, §78B-1 l-129(e) is not applicable.
The trial court's Order vacating the award appealed from here was not a final
Order. This Court has made clear that "for an order or judgment to be final, it must
dispose of the case as to all the parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of the
litigation on the merits of the case. In other words, it must end the controversy between
the litigants, leaving nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Powell v.
Cannon, 2008 UT 19, T| 11; 179 P. 3d 179 (citations omitted). If the Order is allowed to
stand, the parties will face a new round of arbitration hearings with a new panel, new
costs and fees, and a new round of testimony from the witnesses. Therefore none of the
bases listed in §78B-11-129 is applicable.

2

By statute, an order granting vacatur without a rehearing is typically reserved for
grounds that, by their nature, preclude a subsequent rehearing of the arbitration. See, e.g.,
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124(3) ("If the court vacates an award on a ground other than
that set forth in Subsection (l)(e) [that there was no agreement to arbitrate], it may order
a rehearing. If the award is vacated on a ground stated in Subsection (l)(a) or (b)
[evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral], the rehearing must be before a
new arbitrator."

14

However, even if grounds identified in § 78B-11-129 had been present, an
immediate appeal under that section is permissive, not mandatory: "(1) A*1 appeal may
be taken..." §78B-11-129 provides a statutory avenue to appeal non-final orders, but
does not mandate such appeals nor does it change interlocutory orders of a trial court into
final orders. This Court and the Court of Appeals have consistently noted that "may" is a
word of permission, not mandate. See, e.g., In re Olympus Const., L.C., 2009 UT 29, f
15, 215 P.3d 129 ("[Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-] 1305 (1) provides, CA dissolved company
in winding up may dispose of the known claims against it by following the procedures
described in this section.' (Emphasis added [by court].) Use of the provisions of this
section is permissive rather than mandatory. That is, a dissolved company may elect to
follow the procedures in this section or it may choose another route."); Diversified
Holdings, L.C v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, % 32, 63 P.3d 686 ("This use of 'may' is
permissive, rather than mandatory"); Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230
(Utah App. 1995) ("[U.R.A.P.] 10(a) provides: 'Within 10 days after the docketing
statement is served, a party may move: (1) To dismiss the appeal or the petition for
review on the basis that the appellate court has no jurisdiction.' Utah R. App. P. 10(a)
(emphasis added [by court]). Rule 10(a) is permissive, not mandatory."); Pugh v. DozzoHughes, 2005 UT App. 203, ^ 13, 112 P.3d 1247 ("a rule 38 motion to substitute parties
on appeal is permissive, not mandatory. See Utah R. App. P. 38(a) (stating another
"party may be substituted as a party" by motion (emphasis added [by court])).")3

That is only logical: Any other reading would compel an immediate appeal when it

1<N

II.

THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). Rule 5(a) provides that an appeal from an interlocutory order
may be sought within 20 days after the entry of the order. U.R.A.P. 5(a). This Court has
explained that "no finality will be ascribed to a memorandum decision or minute entry for
purposes of triggering the running of the time for appeal until the prevailing party
prepares and submits a proposed order." Houghton v. Dept of Health, 2008 UT 86, If 11;
206 P. 3d 287; citing to Code v. Dept. of Health, 2007 UT 43, ^ 9, 162 P.3d 1097.
In this matter, the trial court issued a Ruling on September 30, 2010, and directed
Westgate to prepare an order consistent with the opinion.

The Order prepared by

Westgate was signed and entered on December 13, 2010. (Exh. 1.) Because the trial
court's Order vacating the award while contemplating a rehearing was not appealable,
CPG filed its Petition for interlocutory appeal on December 22, 2010, well within the 20
days allotted by Rule 5(a).

Therefore the Petition was timely and the Court has

jurisdiction.
Even if the Court were to hold that an appeal pursuant to § 7 8B-11-129 is an
appeal as of right, the Petition for interlocutory appeal was also timely pursuant to Rules
3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures. In Cedar Surgery Center, LLC. v.
Bonelli, this Court held that a petition for interlocutory appeal was sufficient to provide
might not otherwise be necessary or desired, sacrificing judicial economy and potentially
causing additional delay. For example, a party might choose not to appeal immediately
an order staying an arbitration if it felt that a resolution of remaining non-arbitrable issues
would resolve the case more quickly (and/or at less expense).
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proper notice of appeal when it had been filed within the 30 days mandated by Rule 4a.
Cedar Surgery Center, LLC v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58,1fi| 10-12; 96 P. 3d 911. Given the
timing of the petition in Bonelli, this Court concluded it did not need to decide if the
district court's order was final. Likewise here, if the Court were to decide that an appeal
in this case pursuant to §78B-11-129 was mandatory the Court should apply the rationale
of Bonelli that "when determining whether a notice of appeal is sufficient, we look to the
substance of the notice-not its caption." Id. at ^J 12.
Applying Bonelli to the situation here is reasonable because a statutory right of
appeal, as that established in § 78B-11-129, is clearly in addition to an appeal from a final
order or from an order certified pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedures. In Pledger v. Gillespie, this Court observed that the Utah Arbitration Act
confers jurisdiction over the enunciated factors "regardless of whether the order is a final
judgment or has otherwise been designated as final by the district court under Rule
54(b)." Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54 ^ 17; 982 P. 2d 572. Indeed, when, as here, the
district court issues an order pursuant to the Utah Arbitration Act vacating a mediation
award while undoubtedly contemplating a rehearing of the arbitration, that Order is more
akin to an interlocutory order than either a final order or one certified under Rule 54.
Although this Court has refused to apply the reasoning of Bonelli in a situation
where the district court had certified the order as final pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54, thus
creating a truly final order, the trial court here did not certify its Order pursuant to Rule
54. See Clark v. Archer, 2010 UT 57; 242 P. 3d 758 (when a judgment is certified as
final under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an appellant must file an
IT

appeal as of right under rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure). In
Clark v. Archer, the Court explained that "presumptively final judgments provide clear
direction to an appellant as to the proper procedures to follow under rules 3 and 4 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Id at % 13. The district court's Order in this case is
not a presumptively final judgment; the first and principle ruling of the trial court was
vacatur, the denial of the other pending motions was an automatic side effect of the
vacatur. Based upon the trial court's order, § 78B-11-129 does not prescribe the method
of appeal or give clear direction to appellants.
Section 78B-11-129(2) provides that "an appeal under this section must be taken
as from an order or a judgment in a civil action." Of course, orders can be final orders or
interlocutory in nature, and it is the nature of the order which determines if a party should
bring an appeal under Rules 3 and 4 or Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
In this matter the district court's order was neither a final order nor one certified pursuant
to U.R.C.P. 54. Therefore CPG was warranted in bringing its appeal as an interlocutory
appeal and this Court has jurisdiction.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE DISCLOSURE
PROVISIONS OF THE ARBITRATION ACT WAS ERRONEOUS.
More than eight and one half years since litigation began, more than six years

since Christensen & Jensen made an appearance in the litigation, more than two years
since arbitration was compelled, and after the expenditure of hundreds of hours of
attorney time and nearly $150,000 in arbitrator fees alone, the parties face having to rearbitrate if the trial court's interpretation of the Arbitration Act is permitted to stand.
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Moreover, under the trial court's order, all of the work of the prior panel, including
rulings on numerous motions and discovery disputes, will be of no legal effect and the
parties will have to begin from scratch.4
It is because of consequences like this - the antithesis of an expedient and costeffective resolution - that the burden for vacating an arbitration award in Utah is steep.
This Court has explained that "a motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award is
limited to determining whether any of the very limited grounds for modification or
vacatur exist." Pacific Development, L.C. v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, ^6, 23 P. 3d 1035
(citing Buzas Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P. 2d 941, 947 (Utah 1996)).
As discussed infra, CPG takes issue with the trial court's ruling that Richard
Burbidge was a "neutral" appointee under the Utah Arbitration Act. However, even
assuming that he was, the trial court erred in two central respects, either of which requires
reversal. Understanding the nature of the error requires articulation of the relationship
among the two disclosure provisions in the Act, one of which applies only to neutrals,
and the other of which applies to both neutral- and party-appointees. As discussed
herein, the trial court erred under either standard.
Neutral appointees are subject to a disclosure requirement in the Act that does not
apply to party appointees.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(5) states that a neutral

appointee who does not disclose a "known, existing, and substantial relationship with a
party" is presumed to act with evident partiality:
Additionally, only portions of the arbitration proceeding were recorded. Consequently,
several live witnesses will have to be brought in again.
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An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does not disclose a
known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the arbitration
proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party is
presumed to act with evident partiality under Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b).
Section 78B-1 l-124(l)(b), in turn, provides:
Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the
court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration proceeding if:
*

(b)

*

*

there was:
(i)

evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a
neutral arbitrator.

In interpreting these provisions, the trial court erred in a couple of respects, either
of which requires reversal. First, it erroneously interpreted "substantial relationship" as
including first-cousin relationships unaccompanied by any personal, social, or financial
relationship. Second, it erroneously assumed that the presumption of evident partiality
was irrebuttable, when all evidence - and Westgate's own concession - was that no
partiality was evidenced by Arbitrator Burbidge.
A.

Richard Burbidge's first-cousin relationship with George Burbidge,
without more, was not a "substantial relationship" with a party.5

The legislature did not define "substantial relationship" within the Arbitration Act,
and this Court need not do so now. It is enough that the (non)relationship in this case
does not qualify.

From the plain language of the statute, it is self-evident that a

5

CPG does not dispute that Richard Burbidge's consanguinity with George Burbidge
was a "known" and "existing" relationship. Consequently, this discussion focuses on
whether it satisfied the third element, a "substantial" relationship with a party.
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"relationship" in itself is insufficient to implicate Section 78B-11-113(5); it must be
"substantial."
This Court has warned against interpreting the Arbitration Act so as to impose an
"appearance of impropriety" standard on arbitrators. In DeVore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc.,
884 P.2d 1246, 1255 (Utah 1994), the Court observed:
[A]s a matter of policy, we think an appearance-of-partiality standard
sets an impractically low threshold, especially in a small state like Utah.
Indeed, to disqualify any arbitrator who has professional dealings with
one of the parties (to say nothing of a social acquaintanceship) would
make it impossible, in some circumstances, to find a qualified arbitrator
at all.6
Similarly, the Utah Ethics Advisory Committee has opined that the participation of
a cousin may result in judicial disqualification under the (former) general Canon 3C(1)
impartiality standard only "if a close personal relationship exists''

(R. 5920, Informal

Opinion No. 89-5 (emphasis added).) The opinion, while not binding on the Court,
supports the contention that a first-cousin relationship alone is not sufficient for
disqualification even of a sitting judge - the genetic relationship must be accompanied by
a personal or social relationship, which all parties agree is not present here.
In short, being one of 22 cousins, with a 19-year age gap, with virtually no
personal interaction - in fact, less of a social relationship than many unrelated attorneys and no financial connection, cannot reasonably be construed as a "substantial"

The Court's observation regarding the effect of the size of the legal community and
jurisdiction is fitting here: Particularly with Utah's large families and unique heritage, it
would be hard to find a law firm in town that does not have a Christensen, Jensen, Snow,
Burbidge, etc.

?1

relationship. See, e.g., Washburn v. McManus, 895 F. Supp 392, 399 (D. Conn. 1994)
("The mere fact of a prior relationship is not in and of itself sufficient to disqualify
arbitrators. The relationship between the arbitrator and the party's principal must be so
intimate - personally, socially, professionally, or financially - as to cast serious doubt on
the arbitrator's impartiality").
In Morelite Construction Corp. v. NY City District Council Carpenters Benefit
Fund, 748 F.2d 79 (2nd Cir. 1984), cited approvingly by this Court in DeVore, the
Second Circuit upheld the disqualification of an arbitrator whose son was president of the
Union, a district chapter of which was a party to the arbitration. However, the court
narrowed its ruling and observed that
[w]e need not, and do not, attempt to set forth a list of familial or other
relationships that will result in the per se vacation of an arbitration
award, except to suggest that such a list would most likely be very short.
We do not intend to hold arbitrators to all the standards of Canon 3. 748
F.2d at 85.
The court also predicted post arbitration "sour grapes" by losing parties, stating
that "[n]either do we intend that unsuccessful parties to arbitration may have awards set
aside by seeking out and finding tenuous relationships between the arbitrator and the
successful party." Id. As a California court stated recently,
[t]he test is an objective one - whether such an impression is created in
the eye of the hypothetical reasonable person. Thus, unless a reasonable
member of the public at large, aware of all the facts, would fairly
entertain doubts concerning the arbitrator's impartiality, the arbitrator is
not subject to disqualification.
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Mahnke v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 565, 579, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 206
(2009). In this matter, a reasonable person, aware of the facts, would not fairly entertain
"7

doubts regarding the impartiality of Richard Burbidge.
B.

The uncontroverted evidence rebutted the presumption of
evident partiality in any event.

Westgate successfully argued below that Richard Burbidge's failure to disclose the
first-cousin relationship with George Burbidge "is both statutorily presumed to constitute
evident partiality and is, in fact, evident partiality . . . ." (R. 5909 at 15; also Exh. 2, p. 31
("It's the presumption, which the statute does not say is rebuttable. . . . We're saying it is,
you know, an irrebuttable presumption of evident partiality which mandates vacatur here
under the statute.").)
But as CPG pointed out, presumptions are just that, presumptions. See, e.g., Exh.
2, pp. 38-39 (U[A] presumption is always rebuttable unless stated otherwise. Courts often
refer to it as a balloon. That the balloon is the presumption, and as soon as evidence is
presented contrary to the presumption, the balloon pops."); U.R.E. 301(1); Burns v.
Both Westgate and the Trial Court relied on a 1968 U. S. Supreme Court opinion for the
proposition that arbitrators are required to "disclose to the parties any dealings that might
create an impression of possible bias." Exh 1 (court's ruling) at 8, quoting
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).).
However, this Court not only rejected that standard in DeVore, but expressly found
reliance upon Commonwealth to be misplaced, noting that the quoted language "captured
only three other votes," and that one of the concurring justices, "Justice White further
concluded that an arbitrator cannot be expected to provide the parties with a complete and
unexpurgated business biography. But it is enough for present purposes to hold, as the
Court does, that where an arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm which had done
more than trivial business with a party, that fact must be disclosed." DeVore, 884 P.2d at
1255 n. 11 (brackets omitted).

?^

Boyden, 2006 UT 14, U 20, 133 P.3d 370; Richard C. Mangrum & Dee V. Benson,
MANGRUM

& BENSON

ON UTAH EVIDENCE,

at 101-102 (2009-2010 ed.) ("If the basic

fact is established and evidence is presented challenging the presumed fact, then the
presumption either disappears . . . or remains to allocate the burden of persuasion as to
the nonexistence of the presumed fact . . . ."). Contrast with Davis v. Provo City Corp.,
2008 UT 59, ffi[ 22-23, 193 P.3d 86 (applying statute in which legislature used term
"conclusive presumption" and citing other statutes with that wording).
Indeed, that the presumption is rebuttable is self-evident in the statute. If the
legislature had intended a failure to disclose a substantial relationship in itself to mandate
vacatur, it would simply have listed such failure to disclose as a ground for mandatory
vacatur under Section 78B-11-124(1), rather than creating a presumption in Section 78B11-113(5).
CPG adduced affirmative, unrefuted evidence rebutting any inference of partiality,
including the fact that no social, personal, or financial relationship existed, that a material
difference in age existed, and that the two Burbidges and their firms have been adverse to
each other in litigation. See pp. 3-4, supra. Moreover, Mr. Burbidge was one of three
arbitrators, whose decision was unanimous, and who, while affording substantial relief to
CPG, did reject portions of CPG's claims. {See R. 5947.)
Once CPG adduced affirmative evidence rebutting the presumption, the burden
fell upon Westgate to come up with something from which "a reasonable person would
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conclude that an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality . . . ." DeVore v.
IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1256 (Utah 1994).8
Westgate adduced no such evidence. In fact, counsel conceded that it had no such
evidence to offer: "So we've never professed, and we agreed to this in the reply, that
we're making a factual showing that Mr. Burbidge engaged in fraud or undue means or
there was evident partiality as a matter of objective evidence or proof We've not pointed
to anything he said or did during the proceedings or anything like that." (Exh. 2, pp. 3031.) (Emphasis added.)
As a matter of law, therefore, Westgate failed to meet the requirements of vacatur
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124( 1 )(b). The appropriateness of this conclusion is
illustrated by the Court's application of a similar standard in DeVore.

In that case,

several years before the arbitration, the sole arbitrator (Mabey) had been an LDS stake
president under whom an adverse witness served as bishop, a relationship that the trial
court characterized as "significant and important."
That relationship, without more, was insufficient for a reasonable person to find
that the arbitrator showed partiality, this Court concluded. "There is no evidence in the
record that this particular relationship has continued in any substantial way since 1980,"
o

Applying similar language in the predecessor to § 78B-11-124, the DeVore, this Court
rejected a standard that would require a party seeking vacatur to prove actual partiality.
However, the movant must prove that "a reasonable person would conclude that an
arbitrator, appointed as neutral, showed partiality . . . . Furthermore, the burden of proof
falls on the movant, and the evidence of partiality must be certain and direct, not remote,
uncertain, or speculative." DeVore, 884 P.2d at 1256 (emphasis added). There is no
material difference between the "showed partiality" language construed in DeVore and
the "evident partiality" language presently utilized in the Act. Id. at 1256 n. 12.

the Court noted. "Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that Mabey continued
to be, if indeed he ever was, influenced by his alleged love, respect, and admiration for
[the witness]. The affidavits submitted by Dr. DeVore contain, at best, remote, uncertain,
and speculative statements. . . . A reasonable person would not regard them as
establishing certain and direct evidence for Mabey's allegiance to [the witness] or any
resultant partiality to IHCH." 884 P.2d at 1257 (emphases added).
The Court further noted that "[t]here is no evidence in the record that Mabey did
anything but use his best judgment to decide the issues of fact and law before him. That
Mabey found IHCH's arguments more persuasive than Dr. DeVore's is not evidence of
bias. Indeed, neither an arbitrator's consistent reliance on the winning party's evidence
nor the arbitrator's conclusion in the winning party's favor establish partiality." Id. at
1257. In this case, the trial court erred in assuming that a presumption of evident
partiality would in itself compel mandatory vacatur, and in failing to recognize that the
presumption had been rebutted by the uncontroverted evidence.
C.

Although the arbitrators all considered themselves neutral and
conducted themselves accordingly after their appointment, Mr.
Burbidge was not a "neutral" appointee under the Arbitration
Act.

Westgate argued that all three arbitrators in this matter were statutorily neutral,
and the trial court considered Richard Burbidge as a "neutral" arbitrator under the statute.
(Exh. 1, pp. 3, 8.) It is true that the Panel members decided after their appointment to
consider themselves neutral, and conducted the proceeding accordingly. They then stated
their understanding in an "Arbitration Fee Agreement" which the parties signed.

0£

A post-appointment decision by arbitrators cannot retroactively transform the
nature of their earlier appointment into the appointment of three statutory "neutrals"
under the Utah Arbitration Act. Indeed, Westgate's choice to forward copies of various
court pleadings ex parte to "its" arbitrator contradicts the argument that it considered its
chosen arbitrator, Judith Billings, to have been a "neutral" appointee.
The appointees in this matter acted in an objective, professional manner
throughout the arbitration and, as discussed above, the same result would obtain
regardless of whether the standards for "neutrals" applied to all three arbitrators.
However, the trial court's failure to address the legal distinction between a partyappointed arbitrator and an arbitrator-appointed arbitrator was error.
As ordered by the trial court in its Order Regarding Westgate Resorts LTD's
Motion to Compel Arbitration (R. 4714), the process utilized in appointing arbitrators in
this case is familiar to anyone who litigates in Utah: each party appointed an arbitrator,
and those two arbitrators appointed a neutral. In practice, attorneys are trained to be, and
generally are, objective in their assessments of facts and law.

Nonetheless, party-

appointees are not "neutral" appointees under the Arbitration Act, and no party could
reasonably claim otherwise.
The Utah Code indirectly recognizes different roles for party-selected arbitrators
and for 'neutral' arbitrators. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-11-112(2); 78B-11113(5); 78B-11-124.

Other courts have similarly recognized that subjecting party-

selected arbitrators to the same disclosures and disqualification requirements is
inconsistent with legislation recognizing the different roles.

See, e.g., Mahnke v.

Superior Court, supra at 577-578; Washburn v. McManus, supra at 399 (some
subjectiveness is tolerated and even expected from party-selected arbitrators); Daiichi
Hawaii Real Estate Corp. v. Lichter, 82 P. 3d 411, 428 (Hawaii 2003) ("it stands to
intuitive reason that a party-appointed arbitrator might view the proceeding through a
more subjective and partial lens than a neutral arbitrator"); Astoria Med. Group, v. Health
Ins. Plan Greater NY, 182 N.E. 2d 85, 88 (1962) ("the very reason each of the parties
contract for the choice of his own arbitrator is to make certain that his 'side' will, in a
sense, be represented on the tribunal"); Aetna Gas & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A. 2d 88,
92 (R.I. 1991) ("it would be inappropriate to require the party-appointed arbitrators to
adhere to the same standard of neutrality as a judge. That standard ignores the practical
realities of arbitration panels composed of party-appointed arbitrators").
As appointees whom the parties had not designated as neutral prior to their
appointment, Richard Burbidge and Judith Billings were subject to the general disclosure
requirements of Section 78B-11-113(1), not the neutral-specific requirements of Section
78B-11-113(5) to which Paul S. Felt, the neutral choice of the other arbitrators, was
subject. Accordingly, no presumption of evident partiality ever arose, and the trial court
erred in vacating the award based upon such a presumption.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT A NONDISCLOSURE UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-11-113(1) HAD
OCCURRED, AND THAT ANY SUCH NON-DISCLOSURE WOULD
MANDATE VACATUR.
If, as CPG contends, Section 78B-11-113(5) has no bearing on this case, that

leaves only one additional provision of the Utah Arbitration Act in play. Utah Code Ann.

§ 78B-11-113(1) is a general disclosure requirement that applies to all arbitrators,
whether party-appointed or neutral.

Because this standard encompasses arbitrators

known to be non-neutral, it imposes a lower standard for disclosure than that for neutrals:
[78B-11-113(1)] Before accepting appointment, an individual who is
requested to serve as an arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, shall
disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration
proceeding and to any other arbitrators any known facts that a reasonable
person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in
the arbitration proceeding, including:

(b) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the
agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration proceeding, their counsel or
representatives, a witness, or another arbitrator.
This provision does not require disclosure of a relationship at all unless "a
reasonable person would consider [the relationship] likely to affect the impartiality of
the arbitrator . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, even if such relationship is found, it
does not mandate vacatur, as the lower court held; failure to disclose under § 78B-11113(1) leaves vacatur to the court's discretion:
[§ 78B-11-113(4)] If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by
Subsection (1) or (2), upon timely objection by a party, the court under
Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b) may vacate an award.
(Emphasis added.)
In citing Section 78B-11-113 as a basis for vacatur, the trial court erred in two
respects: First, for the reasons discussed above, CPG submits that no reasonable person
would conclude that the relationship at issue in this case was "likely" to affect Arbitrator
Burbidge's impartiality. The "any known facts that a reasonable person would consider"

on

must include not only the consanguine connection, but also the remote, nearly nonexistent nature of the rapport between the arbitrator and his detached cousin. The statute
places the duty to evaluate all the facts surrounding the situation on "an arbitrator, after
making a reasonable inquiry." Therefore, the arbitrator must evaluate not just the first
cousin connection in a vacuum, but all the facts associated with that connection. To
insist that Arbitrator Burbidge erred when he did not disclose his flimsy link to George
Burbidge strips the statute of its clear meaning.
Second, even if a reasonable person could find such likelihood, it does not
mandate vacatur, as the trial court ("reluctantly") believed; rather, the issue is subject to
the exercise of sound discretion. Because CPG adduced uncontroverted evidence that
there was no tie between the Burbidges beyond shared ancestors, it would have been an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to vacate the award under the standard applicable to
party appointees. Consequently, it is appropriate on these undisputed facts for the Court
to remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of CPG.
V.

WESTGATE WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO OBJECT TO ARBITRATOR
BURBIDGES PARTICIPATION.
As noted above, CPG argued that Westgate had waived any right to object to

arbitrator Burbidge's participation or the alleged non-disclosure.

CPG argued that

Westgate failed to raise an objection within a reasonable period after it knew or should
have known of the grounds for the objection. CPG also argued that the court should
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consider the arguably less-than-coincidental timing of the motion, i.e., shortly after an
unfavorable ruling was issued, a year and a half into the arbitration. (R. 5977.)
The trial court ruled that, because Westgate filed its motion to vacate within 90
days of the issuance of the award (the prescribed deadline for such a motion), Westgate's
filing was timely. (Exh. 1, p. 8.) But that was not CPG's argument. CPG agreed that
Westgate's motion to vacate was filed within 90 days of the award.

CPG argued,

however, that Westgate had waived the grounds upon which vacatur was sought, because
it did not object to arbitrator Burbidge's participation or alleged non-disclosure within a
reasonable time of when it knew, or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have
known, of the perceived grounds. (R. 5975.)
If it was the trial court's intent to suggest that waiver cannot be argued under the
Utah Arbitration Act, such interpretation would be inconsistent with a long line of case
law to the contrary. See ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 65, ffl|
26-36, 245 P.3d 184, and cases cited. The trial court flatly erred in failing to address
CPG's argument, and to consider whether a waiver by conduct had occurred, particularly
given the post-award timing of Westgate' s obj ection.
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Temporal proximity has long been recognized as evidence of motive. See, e.g., Vikrton
v. Labor Commission, 2001 UT App 394 fii 6 ("[njormally, a close temporal proximity
between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action may justify an
inference of retaliatory motive.") (internal citations omitted); State of Utah v. Germonto,
868 P.2d 50, 59 (Utah 1993)(in a criminal context, information may be consolidated
where the crimes were part of the same criminal episode, evidence of which may be the
temporal proximity of the crimes.)

i i

Remand on this issue is not required, however, because CPG's argument was
largely based upon undisputed facts. According to Westgate, all that was required to
learn of the alleged nondisclosure was to notice that an attorney named Burbidge was
listed on Christensen & Jensen's letterhead.

(R. 6049.)

This was, by definition,

something that Westgate could have observed at any time over the prior six years.
As one federal court judge has observed, when information about an arbitrator
"could have been ascertained by more thorough inquiry or investigation, a post-award
challenge suggests that nondisclosure is being raised merely as a tactical response to
having lost the arbitration or an inappropriate attempt to seek a second bite at the apple
because of dissatisfaction with the outcome." Hobet Mining, Inc. v. International Union,
United Mine Workers of America, 877 F. Supp. 1011, 1019 (S.D.W.Va. 1994) (internal
citations omitted).
In a similar context, but involving the disqualification of a judge, this Court has
stated:
A party who has a reasonable basis for moving to disqualify a judge may
not delay in the hope of first obtaining a favorable ruling and then
complaint only if the result is unfavorable. Not only is such a tactic
unfair, but it may evidence a belief that the judge is not in fact biased.
Furthermore, delay imposes unnecessary disruption on both the judicial
system and litigants. A disqualification proceeding is a collaterally attack
on the substantive action, it disrupts orderly litigation, and it necessarily
results in significant additional costs to the parties. Accordingly, a party
must move with dispatch once a basis for disqualification is discovered.

i~>

Madsen v. Prudential Fed Sav. & Loan Ass % 161 P.2d 538, 544 (Utah 1988).
George Burbidge's name has been on Christensen & Jensen's firm header
throughout C & J's representation of CPG, which began in 2004. See R. 5933 (select
copies of correspondence from C & J to Westgate's counsel, Richard Epstein.) Indeed, it
is undisputed that the very letter in which CPG appointed Arbitrator Burbidge was on that
same letterhead, that Burbidge's name was prominently at the top of the letterhead, and
that the letter was directed to Westgate's lead counsel. See Exh 3 hereto. In the court
below, Westgate offered no explanation for the timing of its letterhead review.
CPG further argued that a previous last-minute "discovery" by Westgate should be
considered. Almost four years into the District Court litigation - and shortly before trial
- Westgate said it had suddenly noticed that the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act
contains an arbitration provision.

Westgate said that none of its attorneys had ever

noticed the statutory provision before, even though it is contained in the UPUAA's key
remedies section, and Westgate had cited other provisions of the UPUAA in the
litigation. (R. 3062.) Westgate used this alleged last-minute discovery to file a motion to
compel arbitration and seek a stay of the trial. (R. 4708.)
Such eleventh-hour (or, in this case, thirteenth-hour) discoveries are antithetical to
the state trial court's goal that the arbitration be "handled as expeditiously as reasonably
10

Although the threshold for seeking recusal of a judge does not apply in arbitration,
analogy to U.R.Civ.P. 63 is informative. Under Rule 63, a party waives any right to seek
recusal unless the motion is brought within 20 days of when "the moving party leams or
with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which
the motion is based." (Emphasis added.)

3?

possible." Arbitration Panel's Pre-Arbitration Order and Hearing Notice, p. 2. See also,
DeVore v. IHC, 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994) ("the policy of our law favors
arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating disputes.")
By Westgate's own admission, the only information needed to discover the
familial relationship was and had been available to Westgate from the beginning of the
arbitration.

Westgate's delay, along with the severe resulting prejudice, supports a

finding of waiver as an alternative reason to reverse as, like the Second Circuit, this Court
cannot "intend that unsuccessful parties to arbitration may have awards set aside by
seeking out and finding tenuous relationships between [an] arbitrator and the successful
party." More lite Construction Corp. v. NY City District Council Carpenters Benefit
Fund, 748 F.2d 79, 85 (2nd Cir. 1984)(cited approvingly by this Court in DeVore,)
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND
LITIGATION EXPENSES ON APPEAL
As urged above, CPG is entitled to an order reversing the trial court's order of
vacatur as manifest error. If CPG prevails in this appeal, it is entitled to "reasonable
attorney fees and other reasonable expenses of litigation" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78B-11-126 (fees and expenses recoverable by prevailing party in contested judicial
proceeding under Section 78B-11-123 (confirmation) or 78B-11-124 (vacatur).)
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's legal ruling
that a first cousin relationship with an attorney not directly involved in the arbitration,
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without more, triggered a duty to disclose on the part of the arbitrator and provided a
basis for vacating the award.
DATED this 18th day of May, 2011.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
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FILED
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD,

RULING
Date: September 30,2010

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.: 020404068

SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

Judge: Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.
I. Procedural Posture
This matter comes before the Court on two outstanding motions: Consumer Protection
Group's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Attorney Fees and Expenses
and For Rule 54(B) Certification of Judgment as Final, and Westgate Resorts' Opposition to
Consumer Protection Group's Combined Motion and Westgate Resorts1 Motion to Vacate
Arbitration Award.
II. Arguments of the Parties
a.

Consumer Protection Group's Arguments in Support of Combined Motion

Consumer Protection Group ("CPG") states that a highly qualified arbitration panel
issued an award of $65,500 in favor of CPG and against Westgate Resorts ("Westgate"). The
Utah Arbitration Act requires the district court to issue an order confirming the arbitration award
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unless the award is modified or corrected pursuant to statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11123. CPG argues that based on this, the arbitration award should be confirmed.
Further, CPG argues entitlement to attorney fees and costs associated with the arbitration
and Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act ("UPUAA") claims. CPG seeks attorney fees on two
independent grounds. First, the UPUAA entitles a prevailing plaintiff to recover reasonable
attorney fees and expenses. Id § 76-10-1605(2). Second, the Utah Arbitration Act provides that
a "court may allow reasonable costs of the motion (to confirm] and subsequent judicial
proceedings." Id. § 78B-1 M26(2); Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc., 925 P.2d
941, 953 (Utah 1996). In the instant case, Westgate refused to voluntarily pay the arbitration
award, forcing CPG to file this motion to confirm.
Finally, CPG requests the arbitration judgment to be certified as a final order under Rule
54(B), as there is no just reason for delay and there is no overlap in this judgment and any other
remaining issues in the case.

hi.

Westgate's Arguments in Opposition to Combined Motion and in Support of Motion to
Vacate Arbitration Award

Westgate avers that the arbitrator chosen by CPG, Richard D. Burbidge, is a first cousin
to CPG attorney George W. Burbidge II. Based on this fact alone, as supported by abundant law,
this Court should deny CPG's Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and grant Westgate's
Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award.
Westgate argues that the statute which requires the Court to confirm an arbitration award
has a key exception; the Court has a duty to confirm unless "the award is vacated pursuant to
Section 78B-11-124." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-123. The exception statute states that the
Court shall vacate an arbitration award if there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed
as a neutral arbitrator, corruption or misconduct by an arbitrator.
Required disclosures, found in Utah Code 78B-11-113, include an existing or past
relationship between any arbitrator and any counsel or representatives of a party to the
arbitration. The statute imposes a duty to disclose to all parties and to other arbitrators any facts
"which a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator." Id.
§ 78B-11-113(2). The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes requires
arbitrators to disclose facts regarding any personal relationship which might affect impartiality or
independence in the eyes of any of the parties. Further, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
disclosure.
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Westgate asserts that there was no such disclosure. In this case, the arbitrators had the
power to award $1.2 million in attorney fees to CPG. George Burbidge's direct financial interest
in the outcome of the case, left in the hands of thefirstcousin Richard Burbidge, is surely a
reason to doubt the validity of any such award. Westgate should have been informed of this
decision so Westgate could choose to demand disqualification from the Panel. Further, the lack
of disclosure to the other arbitrators surely poisoned the well, calling into question any decision
of the Panel.
Westgate further argues that it does not matter that Arbitrator Burbidge was selected by
CPG. There was still a duty to disclose, CPG cannot argue that Westgate knew that Arbitrator
Burbidge was not neutral because the Panel prepared a fee agreement in which the arbitrators
designated themselves as neutral arbitrators. The arbitrators were bound by the Code of Ethics,
and thus bound by duty to disclose any potential conflicts or reasons for impartiality, such as a
familial relationship with a party or its counsel.
Under section 78B-11-113(4) an arbitrator's failure to disclose a fact such as an existing
or past relationship with a party's counsel, is grounds for vacating under 78B-1 l-124(b). Failure
to disclose constitutes "evident partiality." Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145,148 (1968),
The Utah Ethics Advisory Committee has opined that the participation of a cousin may
result injudicial disqualification. Further, if the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned, the judge should either recuse or disclose the relationship to the parties to allow them
to decide whether recusal is warranted.

&

CPG's Arguments Against Westgate's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award

CPG argues that Westgate has waived any rights to seek recusal. First, the timing of
Westgate's Motion to Vacate, given its history in this litigation, is suspect Losing parties in an
arbitration should not get a second bite at the apple when the facts show that the losing party
should have discovered their basis for disqualification or recusal before the arbitration.
CPG asks the Court to look at the timing of the motion to vacate, which is clear evidence
of Westgate's motive. Further, Westgate has a history of making prior late discoveries, costing
the parties great expense and time.
Moreover, CPG argues that Arbitrator Burbidge was not technically neutral under the
Utah Arbitration Act. However, the arbitrators did consider themselves neutral after their
appointment and conducted themselves accordingly.
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Party-selected arbitrators are clearly not the same as arbitrator-appointed arbitrators.
Courts have recognized the differences between them. For example, it is reasonable that partyselected arbitrators might have some subjectiveness and they are not expected to adhere to the
same standard of neutrality as a judge. In fact, even if a party-selected arbitrator had a substantial
relationship with a party or attorney, the law states that the arbitrator "may not serve as an
arbitrator required by an agreement to be neutral." Id § 78B-11-112(2) (emphasis added).
CPG points out that there was no such neutrality agreement; it was added by the arbitrators
themselves after they commenced the arbitration.
Even if all the arbitrators had been neutral, CPG argues that Westgate did not even come
close to making a prima facie case for disqualification. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that to
vacate an arbitration award, "the evidence of partiality must be certain and direct, not remote,
uncertain, or speculative." DeVore v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246,1256 (Utah 1994).
CPG argues that Westgate's motion is full of speculation. The only feet alleged is that the
Burbidges are first cousin. Every other "fact" drawn from that is mere hypothesis and conjecture.
Further, CPG contends that Westgate misquoted a Utah Ethics Advisory Committee
opinion regarding whether a judge who is a cousin to one of the parties should recuse. The &U
quote shows that the cousin relationship is relevant only "if a close personal relationship exists."
Utah Ethics Advisory Committee, Informal Opinion 89-5.
George Burbidge II and Richard Burbidge do not have a close personal relationship.
Richard is one of 22 first cousins of George. They are nearly 20 years apart in age. They do not
speak regularly, have no active social relationship, no business or personal connection, and in
fact have not spoken in many months. Indeed, the Burbidges have been adverse to each other in
litigation before. A mere genetic relationship does not constitute a substantial relationship
requiring disclosure or recusal.
CPG argues that Westgate has provided no evidence supporting claims of corruption,
fraud, undue means, or evident partiality. Arbitrator Burbidge has no interest in the outcome of
the arbitration, and no existing substantial relationship with any party. Because no evidence to
support any of the statutory or judicially created grounds exists, a motion to vacate an award
must be denied. Buzas Baseball Inc. v Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d at 951.
Moreover, federal decisions do not support Westgate* s argument. CPG cites several
federal cases to show that the standard to vacate an arbitration award is a heavy, onerous burden,
and that the mere existence of a genetic relationship or the mere fact of a prior relationship is not
sufficient to cast doubt on the arbitrator's impartiality. If a reasonable person objectively
viewing all the facts would fairly entertain doubts about impartiality, then the arbitrator would be
subject to disqualification. CPG alleges that once all the facts are known about the relationship
between the two Burbidges, no reasonable person could have doubts about Arbitrator Burbidge's
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impartiality. Also, general guidelines from the American Arbitration Association and found in
the Uniform Arbitration Act do not support vacating this award under these circumstances.
Finally, CPG asserts that Westgate's motion is brought in bad faith. Westgate did not file
a certificate that the motion was filed in good faith, which would have been required in a motion
to disqualify a judge under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63. Westgate's long history of
attacking CPG and delaying the judicial process continues with the motion to vacate. Without
supporting evidence, Westgate accuses Arbitrator Burbidge and CPG of impropriety and bias.
These accusations should not be tolerated.
Based on the foregoing, CPG seeks confirmation of the arbitration award and denial of
Westgate's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award.

d-

Westgate's Reply Arguments to CPG's Opposition to Westgate's Motion to Vacate

In reply, Westgate argues that it never waived the right to move to vacate based on
Arbitrator Burbidge's failure to make a statutorily required disclosure. The burden was not on
Westgate to discover an improper link between arbitrator and attorney; the burden was on the
parties so linked to disclose. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113.
Further, the concealment of the relationship calls into question the impartiality of the
arbitrator. Thus, both the relationship and the concealment of the relationship create doubts as to
the validity of the outcome of the arbitration. Also, CPG's citation of Rule 63 and its 20-day
deadline is not applicable in this case as the rule applies only to judges.
The emails show that Westgate brought this issue to the attention of the parties as soon as
it noticed the similarity in names. After confirmation that the Burbidges were first cousins,
Westgate immediately sent a letter to the Panel raising the issue. There was no bad-faith delay by
Westgate. The bad faith is by CPG, who failed to make required disclosures, and Arbitrator
Burbidge, who is statutorily required by Subsection 78B-11-113(1) to disclose before accepting
appointment.
Moreover, Westgate argues that CPG's contention that Burbidge was not neutral simply
confirms the doubts as to his impartiality. It also goes against the Arbitration Fee Agreement,
which stated that "(t]he panel members each consider themselves as neutral arbitrators." Also,
because Burbidge told the parties he was neutral, then any argument that there was no duty to
disclose the relationship is wrong. Westgate had every reason and right to believe that the Panel
was composed of neutral arbitrators, based on the parties' agreement, on statutory law, and on the
representation of the Panel.
Page 5 of 9

Westgate reiterates that according to Utah statute, an arbitrator who does not disclose a
relationship with counsel "is presumed to act with evident partiality." Id § 78B-11-113(5).
Thus, Westgate did not have to produce evidence of partiality because the failure to disclose
gives rise to a presumption of partiality. The Panel itself expressly adopted the AAA Code of
Ethics, which requires all arbitrators, whether neutral or not, to disclose any facts which might
affect their neutrality, independence and partiality. A familial relationship is obviously one
which falls within the type of information that might reasonably affect impartiality and should be
disclosed. See Burlington Northern Railroad Corp v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629,637 (Tex.
1997). Westgate also argues that CPG's cited cases do not support its contention.
Finally, Westgate contends that CPG has engaged in distortion, deceit, and
misrepresentation.
Based on the foregoing, Westgate requests this Court to vacate the arbitration award.

HI. Ruling

The Court reluctantly grants Westgate's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award and denies
CPG's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Attorney Fees and Expenses and
For Rule 54(B) Certification of Judgment as Final. The Utah Uniform Arbitration Act provides:
(1) Before accepting appointment, an individual who is requested
to serve as an arbitrator, after making a reasonable inquiry, shall
disclose to all parties to the agreement to arbitrate and arbitration
proceeding and to any other arbitrators any known facts that a
reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality
of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding, including:

(b) an existing or past relationship with any of the parties to the
agreement to arbitrate or the arbitration proceeding, their counsel
or representatives, a witness, or another arbitrator.

(4) If the arbitrator did not disclose a fact as required by Subsection
(1) or (2), upon timely objection by a party, the court under
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Subsection 78B-1 l-124(l)(b) may vacate an award.
(5) An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator who does not
disclose a known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of
the arbitration proceeding or a known, existing, and substantial
relationship with a party is presumed to act with evident partiality
under Subsection 78B-1 l-124(i)(b).

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113. Additionally, "[a]n individual who h a s . . , a known, existing,
and substantial relationship with a party may not serve as an arbitrator required by an agreement
to be neutral," under § 78B-11-112(2).

When an arbitrator fails to disclose or otherwise violates the rights of a party to the
proceeding, § 78B-11-124 provides:

(1) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration
proceeding, the court shall vacate an award made in the arbitration
proceeding if:

(b) there was:
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral
arbitrator; [or]

(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to
the arbitration proceeding.

Such motion must be filed within 90 days. See Id, If the Court grants that motion, then the Court
is not required to issue an order confirming the award. See Id. § 78B-11-123,
The question at issue is whether Richard D. Burbidge should have disclosed his
relationship to counsel. A first cousin relationship is a fact that an arbitrator would be required to
disclose because a reasonable person would consider this fact likely to affect the impartiality of
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the arbitrator. In the present case, the arbitrator Richard D. Burbidge did not disclose his
relationship to counsel as he was required to do by statute.
CPG asserts the relationship is not particularly close and that this omission does not meet
the standard to vacate the award because "the evidence of partiality must be certain and direct,
not remote, uncertain, or speculative.'1 DeVore v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 884 P.2d 1246,1256. But
the standard is not proof-of-actual-bias; this standard would be neigh impossible to meet Id. The
"certain and direct, not remote, uncertain, or speculative" evidence must be evidence of facts that
"a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator." Utah Code
Ann. §78B-11-113. The first cousin relationship is an uncontroverted fact.
The quality of the Burbidges' relationship does not change Arbitrator Burbidge's duty to
disclose. Though CPG argues a judge in a similar situation need not recuse, the Supreme Court
of the United States has ruled, "[W]e should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard
the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former have completely free rein to decide
the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate review. We can perceive no way in
which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will be hampered by the simple requirement
that the arbitrators disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible
bias." Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145,148 (1968).
Additionally, the arbitrators were all designated as neutral in the fee agreement Even if
this was done sua sponte7 the designation that they were neutral is in a fonnal agreement with the
parties. Under Utah Code § 78B-11-112(2), Arbitrator Burbidge, in the absence of disclosure,
should not have served at all, and under § 78B-11-113(5) his service creates a presumption of
partiality.
His failure to disclose the relationship as required by § 78B-11-113(l)(b) violated the
rights of Westgate to know the facts Arbitrator Burbidge was required to reveal, and he is
presumed partial under § 78B-11-113(5). CPG's argument that Westgate's motion should be
denied for timeliness fails. The statue sets the time limit at 90 days. The award was entered
February 2,2010. Westgate filed its motion April 8,2010. Westgate*s motion was timely.
Therefore, this Court vacates the arbitration award according to §§ 78B-1 l-124(l)(b)(i) and (iii).
Wcstgate's Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award is granted.
CPG's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and for Attorney Fees and
Expenses and For Rule 54(b) Certification of Judgement as Final is denied.
The Court instructs counsel for Westgate to prepare an order consistent with this opinion.
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DEC 1 3 20!(T
4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WESTGATB RESORTS, LTD..
Plaintiff

vs.

ORDER ON CONSUMER PROTECTION
GROUP, IXC'S COMBINED MOTION
TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD
AND FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND
EXPENSES AND FOR RULE 54(B)
I CERTIFICATION OP JUDGMENT AS
1 PINAL, AND WESTGATE RESORTS
LIU'S
MOTION
TO
VACATE
ARBITRATION AWARD

SHAUNS.ADBL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,
Case No.: 020404068
Defendants.
Division No. 8
Judge: Lynn W.Davis

Pursuant to this Court's Ruling dated September 30,2010, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
and incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that:
1.

Westgate Resorts, Ltd/s Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award is GRANTED;

2.

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Arbitration Award dated February

2, 2010 issued in the aibitration proceedings styled: Consumer Protection Group, LLC v.
Westgate Resorts, Ltd., is VACATED, RENDfiRBD NULL AND VOID and OF NO FORCE
AND EFFECT; and
3.

Consumer Protection Group, LLC's Combined Motion to Confirm Arbitration

Award and for Attorney Fees and Expenses and For Rule 54(b) Certification of Judgment as
Final is DENIED.

DATED this

W

day ofO*****, 2010.

Approved As To Fonn:
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2 J

(Electronically recorded on August 4, 2010)

3 I

THE COURT: You may be seated.

Let's go on the record

4 I in the case of Westgate Resorts vs. Shaun Adel and CPG.
5 J is 020404068.

This

Record will reflect that Richard Epstein is

6 there, as it relates to Westgate Resorts.

Rich Humphreys, Karra

7 I Porter here representing the defendants.
8 I
9 I me.

Counsel, let's see, I only brought one file before
It's file 19 in this case.

So it's —

10 J history, as we all are aware, in this case.

there's a bit of
We've had —

today

11 I we've had somewhere between 80 and 85 felony cases, some civil
12 I cases.

The criminal cases range everything from a first-degree

13 I murder case to a variety of other —

other matters.

If I don't

14 I seem real sharp in responding to your questions, there is a
15 I reason for that.
16 I

Let me -- let me state on the record what I believe is

17 I the procedural posture as it relates to the matters before the
18 I Court, and then a briefing as it relates to the substantive
19 I arguments on both sides.

Then I have a couple of questions

2 0 I that will give you some guidance, and then we can proceed.
21 I

The matter comes before the Court on two outstanding

22 J motions; CPG's combined motion to confirm arbitration award
23 I and for attorney's fees and expenses, and for a Rule 54(b)
24 J certification of judgment is final, as Westgate's opposition
25 I to CPG's combined motion, and Westgate's motion to vacate the

-3
1

arbitration award.

2

The arguments of the parties —

the briefing is very

3

extensive, and I think fairly thorough; but to consolidate the

4

arguments, 1 think they can be presented as follows.

5

arguments in support of the combined motion are as follows.

6

We have CPG states that a highly qualified arbitration panel

7

issued an award of 60,000 —

8

against Westgate.

9

CPG's

$65,500 in favor of CPG and

The Otah Arbitration Act requires a District Court to

10

issue an order confirming arbitration award, unless the award

11

is modified or corrected pursuant to statute.

12

Utah Code Annotated 78 (b)-11-123.

13

They rely upon

CPG argues that based on this, the arbitration award

14

should be confirmed.

15

attorney's fees and costs associated with the arbitration and

16

Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, the UPUAA claims.

17

Further, CPG argues entitlement to

CPG seeks attorney's fees on two independent grounds.

18

First, the UPUAA entitles a prevailing plaintiff to recover

19

reasonable attorney's fees and expenses.

20

1605(2).

21

quote, MA Court may allow reasonable costs of the motion to

22

confirm in subsequent judicial proceedings, based upon Buzz's

23

Baseball, Inc. vs. Salt Lake Trappers."

24
25

That's under 76-10-

Second, the Utah Arbitration Act provides that a,

In the instant case, Westgate refused to voluntarily
pay the arbitration award, forcing CPG to file this motion for
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confirmation.

2

be certified as a final order under Rule 54 (b) . There is no

3

just reason for delay, and there's no overlap in this judgment,

4

in any other remaining issues in the case.

5

Finally, CPG requests the arbitration judgment

Westgate's argument in opposition to the combined

6

motion and in support of its motion to vacate the arbitration

7

award are as follows.

8

chosen by CPG, that Richard D. Burbidge, is a first cousin to

9

CPG attorney, George W. Burbidge, II.

Westgate avers that the arbitrator

Based upon this fact

10

alone, it's supported by abundant law this Court should deny

11

CPG's motion to confirm arbitration award, and grant Westgate's

12

motion to vacate the arbitration award.

13

Westgate argues that the statute which requires the

14

Court to confirm an arbitration award has a key exception, if,

15

quote, the award is vacated pursuant to section 78(b)-11-124.

16

The exception statute states that the Court shall vacate an

17

arbitration award if there was evident partiality by an

18

arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator, or corruption,

19

or misconduct by an arbitrator.

20

Required disclosures found in Utah Code 78(b)-11-113

21

include an existing or past relationship between any arbitrator

22

and any Counsel or representative of party to the arbitration.

23

The statute imposes a duty to disclose to all parties, and

24

to other arbitrators any facts, quote, "which a reasonable

25

person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the
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arbitrator."

2

The code of ethics for the arbitrators —

3

arbitrators in commercial disputes requires arbitrators to

4

disclose facts regarding any personal relationship which might

5

affect impartiality or independence in the eyes of any parties.

6

Further, any doubt should be resolved in favor of disclosure.

7

or for

Westgate asserts that there was no such disclosure.

8

In this case the arbitrators have the power to award 1.2

9

million in attorney's fees to CPG.

George Burbidge's direct

10

financial interest in the outcome of the case left in the hands

11

of his first cousin, Richard Burbidge, surely a reason to doubt

12

the validity of any such award.

13

Westgate should have been informed of this decision

14

so Westgate could choose to demand disqualification from the

15

panel. Further, the lack of disclosure to the other arbitrators

16

surely poisoned the well, calling into question any decision

17

with the panel.

18

Westgate further argues that it does not matter that

19

arbitrator Burbidge was selected by CPG, there was still a

20

duty to disclose.

21

arbitrator Burgess —

22

panel prepared a fee agreement in which the arbitrators

23

designated themselves as neutral arbitrators.

24
25

CPG cannot argue that Westgate knew that
Burbidge was not neutral, because the

The arbitrators were bound by the code of ethics,
and thus bound by duty to disclose any potential conflicts or
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reasons for impartiality, such as a familial relationship with

2

a party or its Counsel.

3

Under Section 78 (b)-11-113(4), an arbitrator's failure

4

to disclose a fact such as an existing or past relationship

5

with the party's Counsel is grounds for vacating under

6

78(b)-11-124(b).

7

partiality.

8

Codings Corporation vs. Continental Casualty.

9

Failure to disclose constitutes evident

That's relied upon the holding in Commonwealth

The Utah Ethics Advisory Committee has opined

10

that the participation of a cousin may result in judicial

11

disqualification.

12

reasonably be questioned, the Judge should either recuse or

13

disclose the relationship to the parties, to allow them to

14

decide whether recusal is warranted.

15

Further, if a Judge's impartiality might

Now, CPG's arguments against Westgate's motion to

16

vacate the arbitration award are confined as follows: CPG

17

argues that Westgate has waived any rights to seek recusal.

18

First, the timing of Westgate's motion to vacate, given its

19

history in this litigation, is suspect.

20

Losing parties in an arbitration —

a losing party in

21

an arbitration should not get a second bite at the apple, and

22

the facts show that the losing party should have discovered the

23

basis for disqualification and recusal before the arbitration.

24
25

CPG asked the Court to look at the timing of the
motion to vacate, which is clear evidence of Westgate's motive.
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He3tgate has a history of making prior relayed discoveries,

2

costing the parties great expense and time.

3

argues that arbitrator Burbidge was not technically neutral

4

under the Utah Arbitration Act.

5

did consider themselves neutral after their appointment, and

6

conducted themselves accordingly.

7

Moreover, CPG

However, the arbitrators

Party selected arbitrators are clearly not the same as

8

arbitrator appointed arbitrators, or Court appointed.

9

have recognized the differences between them.

Courts

For example, it

10

is reasonable that party selected arbitrators might have some

11

subjectiveness.

12

standard of neutrality as a Judge.

13

They're not expected to adhere to the same

In fact, even if a party selected arbitrator has

14

a substantial relationship with a party or attorney, the

15

law states that the arbitrator, quote, "may not serve as an

16

arbitrator required by an agreement of neutrality," or to be

17

neutral.

18

Now, CPG points out that there was no such neutrality

19

agreement.

20

they commenced the arbitration.

21

been neutral, CPG argues that Westgate did not even come close

22

to making a prima facie case for disqualification.

23

It was added by the arbitrators, themselves, after
Even if the arbitrators had

Utah Supreme Court ruled to vacate an arbitration

24

award, the evidence of partiality must be certain, direct, not

25

remote, uncertain or speculative.

CPG argues that Westgate's

-81

motion is full of speculation.

2

Burbidges are first cousins.

3

is mere hypothesis and conjecture.

4

The only fact alleged is that
Every other fact drawn from that

Further, CPG contends that Westgate misquoted a Utah

5

Ethics Advisory Committee opinion regarding whether a Judge

6

who is a cousin to one of the parties should recuse.

7

quote shows that the cousin relationship is relevant only,

8

quote, *if a close personal relationship exists."

9

Advisory Committee and formal opinion 89-5.

The full

(Jtah Ethics

10

George Burbidge, II and Richard Burbidge do not have a

11

close personal relationship. Richard is one of 22 first cousins

12

of George.

13

not speak regularly, have no active social relationship, no

14

business or personal connection, and in fact have not spoken

15

in many months.

16

each other in litigation before.

17

does not constitute a substantial relationship requiring

18

disclosure or recusal.

19

They are nearly 20 years in age apart.

They do

Indeed, the Burbidges have been adverse to
A mere genetic relationship

CPG argues that Westgate has provided no evidence

20

supporting the claims of corruption, fraud, undue means, or

21

evident partiality.

22

in the outcome of the arbitration, no existing substantial

23

relationship with any party.

24

any of the statutory or judicially created grounds exist, a

25

motion to vacate an award must be denied.

Arbitrator Burbidge has no interest

Because no evidence to support
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Moreover, Federal decisions to support Westgate's

2

argument do not in fact support Westgate's argument.

3

cites several Federal cases to show that the standard to vacate

4

an arbitration award is a heavy, onerous burden; and that the

5

mere existence of a genetic relationship or the mare fact of

6

prior relationship is not sufficient to cast doubt on the

7

arbitrator's impartiality.

8
9
10
11

CPG

A reasonable person objectively viewing all the facts
would fairly entertain doubts about impartiality.

Then the

arbitrator would be subject to disqualification.
CPG alleges that once all the facts are known about the

12

relationship between the two Burbidges, no reasonable person

13

could have doubts about arbitrator Burbidge's impartiality.

14

Also, general guidelines from American Arbitration Association

15

found in the Uniform Arbitration Act do not support vacating

16

this award under these circumstances.

17

Finally, CPG asserts that Westgate's motion is brought

18

in bad faith.

19

motion was filed in good faith, which would have been required

20

in a motion to disqualify a Judge under Utah Rule of Civil

21

Procedure 63.

22

Westgate did not file a certificate that the

Westgate's long history of attacking and delaying the

23

judicial process continues with a motion to vacate.

24

supporting evidence, Westgate accuses arbitrator Burbidge and

25

CPG of an impropriety and bias.

Without

These accusations should not

-101 I be tolerated

Based on the foregoing, CPG seeks confirmation

2 J of the award and denial of Westgate's motion to vacate the
3 I arbitration award.
4 I

Lastly, m

reply, Westgate argues that it never waived

5 I the right to move to vacate based upon arbitrator Burbidge's
6 I failure to make a statutory required disclosure.

The burden

7 I was not on Westgate to discover an improper link between an
8 I arbitrator and an attorney.

The burden was on the parties so

9 I linked to disclose.
10

Further, the concealment of the relationship calls

11 I into question the impartiality of the arbitrator

Thus, both

12 I the relationship and the concealment of the relationship create
1 3 J doubts as to the validity of the outcome of the arbitration.
14 J Also, CPG's citation of Rule 63 and its 20-day deadline is not
15 I applicable in this case, as the rule applies only to Judges.
16 I

The emails attached as exhibits show that Westgate

17 I brought this issue to the attention of the parties as soon as
18 I it noticed the similarity in names.

After confirmation that

19 I the Burbidges were first cousins, Westgate immediately sent a
20 I letter to the panel raising the issue.
21 I

There's no bad faith delay by Westgate.

The bad

22 I faith is by CPG, who failed to make required disclosures, and
23 I arbitrator Burbidge, who was statutorily required by subsection
24 I 78(b)-11-113 to disclose before accepting appointment.
25 I

Moreover, Westgate argues that CPG's contention that

-111 I Burbidge was not neutral simply confirms the doubt —
2 I as to his impartiality.

doubts

Also goes against the arbitration fee

3 I agreement, which states, quote, that the panel members each
4 I consider themselves as ^neutral arbitrators,"
5 I

Also, because Burbidge told the parties he was

6 I neutral, and any argument that there was no duty to disclose
7 I the relationship is just absolutely wrong.

Westgate had every

8 J reason and right to believe that the panel was composed of
9 I neutral arbitrators, based on the parties' agreement, on
10 I statutory law, and the repres -- actual representations of
11 I the panel.
12 I

Westgate reiterates that according to Utah statute, an

13 I arbitrator who does not disclose a relationship with Counsel is
14 I presumed to act with evide'nt partiality.

Thus, Westgate did

15 I not have to produce evidence of partiality because of the
16 I failure to disclose.

The very act, or the very failure to

17 I disclose gives rise to a presumption of partiality.
18 I

The panel, itself, expressly adopted the triple A code

19 I of ethics, which requires all arbitrators, whether neutral or
20 J not, to disclose any facts which might affect their neutrality,
21 J independence and partiality.

A familial relationship is

22 I obviously one of those which follows within the type of
23 I information that might reasonably affect impartiality, and
24 I should be disclosed, based upon the Burlington Northern
25 I Railroad Corporation vs. Tucco, Inc.
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Fmally, Westgate contends that CPG has engaged

2

distortion, deceit, and misrepresentation.

3

foregoing, Westgate requests this Court to vacate the

4

arbitration award.

5

m

Based upon the

Now, here are my questions for you.

I don't know

6

whether the award of $65,000 frankly is an award that favors

7

Westgate or favors CPG.

8

for millions of dollars, and there was an award of $65,000, it

9

would appear to the Court, then, that Westgate is in fact

10

I have no idea.

If CPG was asking

—

has prevailed at the arbitration hearing.

11

Next, the United States Supreme Court stated, "We

12

should, if anything, be even more scrupulous to safeguard the

13

impartiality of arbitrators than Judges."

14

relates to arbitrators than Judges.

15

completely free reign to decide the law, as well as the facts,

16

and are subject to appellate review, we can perceive no way

17

in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will

18

be hampered by the simply requirement that the arbitrators

19

disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an

20

impression of possible bias."

21

More so as it

"Since the former have

Well, the issue is dealings, at least under that case

22

law.

23

one hand you have the CPG attorneys and relationship as it

24

relates to the arbitrator, though it's a very distant cousin

25

relationship.

Not familial relationship, but dealings.

Now, on the

As pointed out, 1 think there is a disparity of
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approximately 20 years.

2

actually been advocates on opposite sides in litigation.

3

They are not close, and they have

Then next question I have is Burbidge is not a very

4

common name.

Why didn't Westgate at least ask CPG about this

5

coincidence?

One could argue that any reasonable opponent in

6

the litigation or arbitration would have wondered what the

7

relationship was, if any, between the Burbidges.

8

common name.

9

If —

It's not a

you know, is there any affirmative duty as

10

it relates to Westgate?

11

significant enough uncommon name so that it may constitute

12

a waiver?

13

from the Court.

14

your arguments.

15

Does it constitute a —

is it a

Those are some of the concerns as it relate -May give some direction as it relates to

Then initially state on the record whether or not

16

the briefing is very extensive, whether or not this short

17

statement on the record appears to be accurate, or whether

18

I've overlooked case law, or overlooked statutory provisions,

19

or missed some of your claims.

20

Let's proceed.

MR. EPSTEIN: Your Honor, I suspect I should probably

21

start, since the motion to confirm is really not in serious,

22

you know, question here.

23

motion to vacate.

It really kind of hinges on the

24

THE COURT: Vacate.

25

MR. EPSTEIN: I think we've all conceded or recognize
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that.

2

THE COURT! Sure.

3

MR. EPSTEIN: One small correction. In your recitation,

4

which, as usual, I think that the parties would both agree was

5

extremely thorough and precisely to the point, in the mot

6

the confirmation of award is governed by 78 (b)-11-123.

—

7

When the Court recited what the exceptions, if you

8

will, to the confirmation would be, it cited to a motion to

9

modify or a motion to correct.

10

that in the statute.

11

vacated, pursuant to Section

It just basically overlooked

The other exception is when the award was
—

12

THE COURT: Sure, yeah.

13

MR. EPSTEIN: —

14

THE COURT: Recognize

15

MR. EPSTEIN: I think it was just a misstatement

16

THE COURT: Yes.

17

MR. EPSTEIN: -- on the Court's part, but the record

18

78(b)-1-124.
—
—

—

I'd just like that to be clear for the record.

19

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

The vacation portion of that, or

20

additional supplementation in connection with the exception,

21

yes, sir.

22

MR. EPSTEIN: Let me start with an observation first;

23

and I think all of us on this side of the bench are certainly

24

guilty of this, and probably guilty of it in our everyday

25

conduct of our practice.

That is that we too often think
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lxke lawyers, as opposed to thinking like the parties to these

2

proceedings, whom we represent.

3

The issue here is not really what Westgate's lawyers

4

did or didn't do, or should or shouldn't have done.

5

in reality as to some of the legal things, it's not what CPG's

6

lawyers did or did not do; except in this case it is a bit

7

different, because CPG's lawyers had personal knowledge of

8

the issue that came to the forefront at the very end of the

9

arbitration proceedings, and you know, we do fault them for

10

Just like

not disclosing that, but we think through the lens of a lawyer.

11

What prompted this issue is really what Westgate

12

thought or thinks or has a right to think, when it now all

13

of a sudden realizes, after having committed its time and

14

its efforts and its resources, albeit through its lawyers,

15

you know, to these three individuals, believing them to be

16

completely unconnected and disinterested in the outcome of the

17

case, and finds out that one of the arbitrators, unbeknownst to

18

Westgate, unbeknownst to the party in the case, was related by

19

a very close degree of {inaudible), first cousins, to a lawyer

20

within CPG's law firm.

21

That's the lens I think we all must look at this

22

What is the party to believe-5

23

maybe —

24

purpose of the disclosures are in the Utah Arbitration Code.

25

It's not to inform the lawyers about this or that.

What is -- that, I think, also

I won't say recasts, but certainly refines what the

It's to
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make sure the parties have the sense and the realization that

2

the process and the proceedings in which they are about to

3

embark are not going to be infected.

4

THE COURT: I agree with that, even in issues as it

5

relates to recusals, and when attorneys appear before me, and

6

I need to indicate as it relates to a relationship or whatever

7

it may be, or a past partnership 20 or 30 years ago.

8
9

It's not the attorneys that are the critical ones
that stand before rae in connection with that ultimate judgment.

10

I allow Counsel then to visit with their parties, with their

11

clients, to ultimately make that determination relative to the

12

issue of recusal.

13

So your point's well taken.

MR. EPSTEIN; Thank you, and just to conclude it,

14

Westgate, in its view, had the right to know this before it

15

engaged, you know, in these proceedings.

16

you know, kind of leaped all the way to the end -- if, in fact,

17

it is demonstrative true that there is no relationship that one

18

would be concerned about between these two gentlemen, that's

19

something that should be sorted out beforehand, not after the

20

fact.

If it, in fact --

I mean, it kind of turns on its head the whole notion

21
22

of disclosure when you say, "But it wouldn't have mattered

23

anyway."

24

disclosure gives the parties the opportunity to evaluate those

25

matters before they engage in the process, and so as to give

I mean, that's not the point.

The point is that the

-171 I them the best opportunity possible to insure that the process
2 I itself is not flawed.

That's what we feel unfortunately

3 I occurred here.
4 I

So let's kind of start very —

5 I level here.

at the very fundamental

As the Court is very aware, this arbitration is —

6 I had somewhat unusual underpinnings.

It is rare, you know, that

7 I an arbitration proceeding is mandated or directed by statute.
8 I It is much more commonplace that there be an agreement to
9 I arbitrate.
10

That is, in fact, the standard process.

We do not have that here.

We demonstratively do

11 I not have a pre-litigation agreement between the parties to
12 I arbitrate their disputes.
13

that.

It doesn't exist; we all acknowledge

In fact, there are very few facts of that type with

14 I which the parties disagree or dispute.
15
16

So what we're dealing with here is an unusual case;
one where sort of standard concepts and practices may not

17 I operate in the traditional way that those of us, I'm sure
18 I Richard and Karra, just like I am, we're very familiar with
19 J the arbitration process.

We deal with it quite a bit in our

20 I normal day-to-day practice, and one that is predicated upon
21 I a pre-litigation ar —
22 I simpler —

agreement to arbitrate is much more

much more simple to implement.

Typically it will

23 I invoke a particular organization and its rules and procedures.
24 I

Here we did not have that.

25 1 you, your Honor —

So basically the Court

—

directed a procedure. So what we essentially
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have here is an arbitration decreed, if you will, by law,

2

where the parties were to arbitrate, and you directed how the

3

arbitrators were to be selected, in a way that is, candidly,

4

pretty commonplace.

5

say traditional —

6

which would be typical in a complex case, to be constituted;

7

because otherwise, it's all going to end up back in your hands,

8

which is something, obviously, that the Court would like to

9

leave as much as possible to the parties.

10

That would be the traditional —

I won't

commonplace way for a three-member panel,

Let the parties have, you know, the involvement and

11

control over the procedures.

So again, nobody is criticizing

12

in any fashion that process.

It was a particular -- it was a

13

particularly appropriate one under these circumstances.

14

Where it left wanting, if you will, that might have

15

been addressed if we had a pre-litigation agreement is some of

16

the other criteria that would be applicable to the selection

17

process.

18

For instance, although it's not really in the record,

19

but I think the Court can take judicial notice, the way the

20

triple A works is that they send you a roster, and you get

21

people that are supposedly qualified, and then you get to go

22

through a selection process much like selecting a jury.

23

get to exercise peremptory challenges, and then you kind or

24

rank the rest of them the way you want.

25

self-regulatory organization, uses a similar procedure.

You
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parties had the right to actually determine what they wanted to

2

know from each of the arbitrator candidates before making a

3

selection.

4

That is a huge distinguishing factor here.

5

thing to say in Hobart that, you know, the late challenge to

6

the arbitrator, you know, is not, you know, legitimate and

7

shouldn't be honored, when there was already an opportunity

8

to fully investigate each of those arbitrator candidates before

9

the selection process actually occurred.

10

No such process existed here.

It's one

What did exist here

11

is the Utah Arbitration Code, which has not investigative

12

procedures, but disclosure procedures.

13

the arbitrator and anyone who might have knowledge about the

14

arbitrator, to make disclosures.

15

It puts the onus on

I think that's where part of CPG's argument is so

16

wrong, in answering your question, your Honor, and where --

17

the notion that Westgate had an obligation to inquire or

18

investigate is also so wrong.

19

law under any of the cases that have been cited; and of course

20

the case law, as the Court has already noted, is extensive.

21

That simply has never been the

In the Commonwealth Codings case, which is the U.S.

22

Supreme Court case, there's no notion, either in Justice

23

Black's majority opinion or Justice White's concurring opinion,

24

that there's some duty on the part of a party to investigate.

25

None.

Never considered.

Never mentioned.

Not even on the
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the right question.

2

That happens in life all the time; but it is the only

3

time in any of the jurisprudence we've looked at in briefing

4

this case, where there was any investigative responsibility on

5

the part of the party, as opposed to disclosure responsibility;

6

and it is so materially different that it is not the guidance

7

the Court should have here, other than to show the stark

8

contrast between what is every other case, and what is Hobart.

9

Hobart is totally distinguishable on that basis, you

10

know, and it has no bearing on the obligation on the part of

11

the arbitrator to disclose.

12

—

13

the arbitrator to disclose was extinguished because of the

14

inquiry that occurred prior to appointment.

15

In that instance the duty on the

any obligation, if you will, that they wanted to imply on

Now, so I understand -- clearly we understand, you

16

know, the Court's thoughts, you know, on this -- on this whole

17

issue of whether there-was some duty to inquire under these or

18

under any other circumstances.

19

our answer is.

I mean, obviously you know what

Our answer --

20

THE COURT: Sure.

21

MR. EPSTEIN: —

must be, "No;" but from a couple of

22

different standpoints.

23

wearing glasses here; and I will tell you, as I was reading

24

over last night and this morning, was reading over the filings

25

that CPG made in this, with the copies of some of samples of

First of all, everyone except Karra's
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So even arguing that this might be one of those

2

situations where inquiry notice is appropriate, the law says

3

otherwise.

4

has an expectation of disclosure?

5

As a practical matter, why would one look if one

Where the law has developed, where disclosure's only

6

one part of the overall picture, such as, for instance, in

7

securities laws, where there is side-by-side with the duty on

8

the one parts, and the issue or to make disclosures, there's

9

also some duty on the part of the purchaser of a security to

10

ask questions if facts are present that would give rise under

11

the law to a duty to make reasonable inquiry.

12

—

13

notice.

14

I just drew a blank what it's called —

What they call

I mean, an inquiry

It's called "inquiry notice."
Again, we don't have that here.

Utah Courts have

15

never spoken in terms of inquiry notice in an arbitration

16

process where there's an affirmative duty of disclosure.

17

Court has ever imposed such a requirement, absent, of course,

18

Hobart, which we've already talked about.

19

So,

No

again, the question is certainly a legitimate

20

one, and I think an appropriate one from the standpoint of

21

evaluating whether the parties may be engaged in intentional

22

action; but none of it -- or malicious action; but none of

23

it dispels the real issue here.

24

provide affirmative disclosure is the only one that the law

25

here recognizes.

That is, that the duty to
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it was favorable to CPG in that they won, for sure.

2

extent that, you know, Westgate lostr it could have been a

3

little worse, but again, that would have —

4

consequential number.

5

To the

it's really not a

It was liability that was hard fought here, not so

6

much the damages, as was sort of down here.

7

its damages to about 500 on a (inaudible) basis, to the $500

8

fair value of the —

9
10
11

CPG just limited

the travel certificate.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. EPSTEIN: What the trip would have been worth, the
two round-trip air fares and a couple of nights at a hotel.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

MR. EPSTEIN: Okay, I would like to just add one thing,

14

I think, to the —

15

the relationship between Misters Burbidge.

16
17

to the issue of evaluating the reality of

THE COURT: Yeah, but I think you've already covered
that satisfactorily; that after the fact

—

18

MR. EPSTEIN: Yeah, but that's really

19

THE COURT: — t h e after the fact or post judgment types

—

20

of considerations is not the focus of the Court.

21

the parties is at the outset as it relates to the relationship,

22

so that they can evaluate prior to the arbitration, period.

23

MR. EPSTEIN: Exactly right, and that's what it is.

The focus of

24

I would just, you know, point out that sort of supplementing

25

that, when you look at 78(b)-11-113, the Legislature has
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I would also point out that the same statute, 11-113,

2

also requites that there be a continuing obligation.

3

the Court is going to hear, you know, from CPG that for a lot

4

of reasons they weren't neutrals, they weren't intended to be

5

neutrals.

6

I know

Let me point out one thing that maybe I think we

7

didn't necessarily emphasize too much.

8

the CPG's opposition, is a letter that Mr. Humphreys wrote to

9

me, complaining and actually criticizing our provision to Judge

10
11

One of the exhibits,

Billings of a stack of pleadings from your Honor's case.
Referring to it essentially as an improper ex parte

12

communication, which certainly, and I'll be the first to

13

acknowledge, would be —

14

proper observation

would be a prudent and probably

—

15

THE COURT: Sure.

16

MR. EPSTEIN: —

17

then I shouldn't have done that.

18

the same documents to everybody else.

19

to be a non-issue, other than I think it is very telling, in

20

the absence of a written pre-litigation agreement, what the

21

parties or the lawyers, themselves, thought about this case.

22

I stand —

if the arbitrators are neutrals, as
We fixed it.

We provided

I mean, it turned out

I stood corrected by Mr. Humphreys that we

23

were to deal with them as we would if it was the triple A or

24

some other jams, some other organization that had administered

25

in these things, you know, and they were neutrals.
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substantial relationship or professional relationship that

2

would impair his neutrality in any form or fashion.

3

MR. EPSTEIN: Well, but he's not the one that makes

4

that decision.

5

Arbitration Ethics allows the —

At the point of disclosure, the Code of

6

THE COURT: Sure.

7

MR. EPSTEIN: —

arbitrator to engage in that kind of

8

an analysis after disclosure has been made, and after a party

9

has raised a question about it.

10

THE COURT: Right.

11

MR. EPSTEIN: Again, cart before the horse.

12

THE COURT: I understand that.

13

MR. EPSTEIN: He may very well have come to that

I understand that.

14

conclusion, and we may very well have honored it, or not;

15

but again, a party is going to look at this much differently

16

than we lawyers might, you know, and believe that Richard

17

Burbidge is, as I, you know, am sure he is.

18

made an accusation that Mr. Burbidge did anything untoward

19

in connection with discharging his duties as an arbitrator,

20

other than failing to make these disclosures.

We've never

Aga.in, as the Court pointed out in its synopsis of the

21
22

—

of CPG's position, we've never used the undue means or fraud

23

trigger under the -- under Section 125.

24

that up.

25

invoked is the evident partiality.

That's not part of it.

We've never brought

The only one that we've
That is only because in
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Arbitration Ethics.

2

THE COURT: Well, did a —

3

diclosure —

4

companion arbitrators have a —

5

relates to that?

6

I suspect they would let you know.

7
8

strict disclosure for requirements, would any
also an arbitration as it

Well, if they knew, they would have to

—

MR. EPSTEIN: I think it's fair to say if they knew,
they probably would have —

9
10

by virtue of a strict

they should have spoken as well.

THE COURT: Okay, very well.

Let's shift gears and go

back to Rich Humphreys or Karra Porter now.

11

MR. EPSTEIN: I think there's one other issue beyond

12

the arbitration.

13

with these proceedings.

They requested attorney's fees in connection

14

THE COURT: Sure.

15

MR. EPSTEIN; It would be just these proceedings.

16

THE COURT: Well, if they prevailed, then they

17

MR. EPSTEIN: Yeah.

18

THE COURT: -- let's go to that, because if they don't

19

prevail

—

20

MR. EPSTEIN: But that's always

21

THE COURT: —

22
23

—

—

of course it's moot; but if they do

prevail, then let's go to your arguments in connection on that.
MR. EPSTEIN: We really don't have one.

I mean, under

24

the UPUAA, both those statutes I believe are discretionary; but

25

it's clear that under the arbitration code, if a motion to
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Court.

2
3

MR. EPSTEIN: Yeah, but there was nothing to say it
shouldn't.

4

THE COURT: Okay.

5

MR. EPSTEIN: It's just that it hadn't been done.

6

What the statute says, though, is if you do vacate for evident

7

impartiality, you order a rehearing.

8

THE COURT: Sure.

9

MR. EPSTEIN: Okay, so it would, I mean, ostensibly

10

go back —

11

be before a new arbitrator.

12

before a new arbitration panel, because that would be the only

13

way that one could extinguish any, you know, any suspicion.

well, if it was a single member, the hearing would
Presumably it would probably be

14

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

15

MR. EPSTEIN: You know

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

MR. EPSTEIN: —

18

THE COURT: Very well.

—

on what might have occurred.
Mr. Humphreys, you need to

19

be —

20

whatever you feel most comfortable.

21

remain right there, or you can come up to the podiura,

MR. HUMPHREYS: If it's all right, I'll stay right

22

here, since I have a number of things to juggle.

23

first of all I would like to indicate that CPG, in its present

24

motion, withdraws a Rule 54 certification.

25

THE COURT: Okay.

Your Honor,
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-- the presumption irrebuttable, and that evidence of the

2

substantial relationship is irrelevant, because they are

3

arguing that.

4

disclose is by itself a prima facie and irrebuttable,

5

unrefutable case to vacate.

6

They are arguing that the mere failure to

That's their best argument.

Now, I would like to suggest, your Honor, that the

7

argument that they make is not correct, either by statute or

8

by facta.

9

the need to disclose.

Counsel was correct; the Legislature did envision
In fact, in Section 113 -- well, at

10

78(b)-11-113 I'll just refer to the subsections from this

11

point forward.

12

In 113 it talks about disclosure by the arbitrators.

13

Now, your Honor, I have a copy of this section of the code,

14

which is critical.

15

have a copy.

I'd be happy to give it to you, unless you

16

THE COURT: I don't have one before me, Counsel.

17

MR. HUMPHREYS: May I give you a copy?

18

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

19

MR. HUMPHREYS: Thank you.

20

THE COURT: As long as you give one to opposing

21
22
23

Counsel.
MR. HUMPHREYS: I've done that.

This is a remnant from

a trip to Alaska last week.

24

THE COURT: Oh.

25

MR. HUMPHREYS: It will be off next week.

All right,
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by subsection (1) or (2) —

2

objection by a party, the Court, under subsection 124(1) (b) —

we just read No, 1 —

3

THE COURT: May.

4

MR. HUMPHREYS: -- may vacate.

upon timely

So now we have to

5

understand why the issue is n may" instead of "shall," because

6

if, again, what they —

7

there is a non-disclosure, there was a duty to disclose, it

8

was material, and there is a presumption that's irrebuttable,

9

therefore why do we have a wmay vacate"?

10
11

what Westgate is arguing is true, that

There is no reason

for that; and that's why their argument fails.
So now we have to get to what, then, does the

12

Legislature give by way of guidance in terms of having the

13

Court consider whether it may vacate.

14

following paragraph No. 5, subparagraph (5), an arbitrator

15

appointed as a neutral, and I'll get to that in a minute.

16

That is found in the

I'll assume for now that Mr. Burbidge is a neutral

17

arbitrator.

18

who does not disclose a known, direct or material interest

19

in the outcome of the arbitration, or a known, existing and

20

substantial relationship with a party is presumed to act with

21

evident partiality, and that it refers to 124(1) (b), which is

22

the basis of their motion to vacate.

23

An arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator

Here there is a presumption.

It is very clear law in

24

Utah that a presumption is always rebuttable unless stated

25

otherwise.

Court's often refer to it as a balloon.

That
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with is evident partiality.

2

presumption; it talks only in terms of a finding by the Court

3

of evident partiality.

4

This doesn't talk in terms of

Before the Court, since Westgate has presented no

5

evidence, is not alleging any evidence, yet now there is

6

evidence before the Court in the form of an affidavit by

7

George Burbidge that there is no basis to support the motion

8

to vacate under Section 124.

9

Honor, given their best argument, it fails; and therefore

10
11

Now, for these reasons, your

there cannot be a vacation of the award.
Now, what I would like to talk about is going back to

12

the duty to disclose, and say -- and address the assumptions.

13

One was that there was a duty to disclose; and that is being

14

assumed by Westgate in order to get to its conclusions, and

15

I've assumed it-

16

Even if —

but let's back up, and if we look at

17

it carefully, we will see that there wasn't even a duty to

18

disclose; because the duty to disclose under paragraph 1 has

19

to do with facts that a reasonable person would consider likely

20

to affect an impartiality.

21

the likelihood can be deemed within a reasonable person's

22

consideration.

23

There are no facts presented where

Therefore, there was not even a duty to disclose by

—

24

on the part of Mr. Burbidge, obviously.

25

although Westgate wishes to portray the opposite inference, the

I think the situation,
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situation and the facts relating to it can be inferred the

2

opposite.

3

Richard Burbidge did not think there would have been

4

any kind of relationship with George Burbidge, or he would have

5

disclosed it.

6

he didn't disclose it was an indication from him that he saw no

7

likelihood of that first cousin relationship being a likelihood

8

of affecting his partial —

9

So an inference can be made that the fact that

impartiality.

Certainly the same on our part; if we would have ever

10

suspected that there was any kind of a relationship between

11

Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge, or anyone else on our

12

firm, for that matter, we would have disclosed it.

In fact,

13

we would not have even appointed Richard Burbidge.

So there's

14

two sides of those inferences; and the presumption now fails

15

once we're dealing in the evidence.

16

So we would suggest the duty does not even arise

17

on the part of Richard Burbidge, or arbitrator Burbidge, to

18

even disclose, unless there is such a likelihood; and there

19

is no such evidence.

20

The same goes to a continuing obligation.

There is no continuing obligation if you don't have

21

the initial predicate, which is the likelihood of affecting

22

impartiality.

23

wasn't even a duty to disclose; so that there's no basis at the

24

outset for a vacation of the award.

25

So we would also suggest, your Honor, that there

Now, there is some suggestion, and it's argued both
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in (inaudible) and explicitly by Westgate, that if there

2

was a non-disclosure, our client Westgate did not have the

3

opportunity to consider the matter, and therefore that's the

4

end.

We have it vacated.

5

The problem with that is the only remedy that Westgate

6

had, had there been a duty, had there been a disclosure, was to

7

object.

8

serve.

9

Objection doesn't mean that arbitrator Burbidge cannot
There then must be a weighing of, okay, what is it?
Is there a likely possibility —

or excuse rae, a

10

likelihood of impart -- well, let me get the right language

11

—

12

impartiality?

13

point in time; and if there wouldn't have been, we would have

14

—

15

still be in the same situation we are today.

16

a likelihood that such a relationship would affect his
Then there would be a factual finding at that

even if there had been a disclosure and objection, we'd

So it is not a correct assumption.

It's a giant leap

17

over a gulf which cannot be made.

18

it wasn't disclosed, therefore we vacate the award.'' We still

19

must look at the merits, and that is exactly why subsection (4)

20

under Section 13 -- 113 was put in by the Legislature.

21

is if there's not a disclosure, the Court may vacate, but

22

there still has to be some kind of evidence of a special

23

relationship.

24
25

To simply state, "Because

That

That is exactly what took place in the case that was
addressed in the ethics opinion by the bar, where a Judge had a

-43relationship of first cousin with the sheriff, and there was an
issue raised that that —

there should be a recusal.

The bar

made it very clear that first cousin alone is not sufficient to
create a basis for recusal.
In fact, if I can refer to that opinion, which is
attached both I think to our memorandum in opposition to the
motion to vacate, Exhibit 6, the bar stated, referring to the
third-degree relationship, which this cousin relationship would
be, but would not disqualify him if a cousin were a party or a
lawyer to the proceeding.

Then it goes on to say it would if a

close personal relationship exists.
Again, the focus isn't on a cousin relationship.
is on the close personal relationship.
basis was in that case.

That's the —

It

what the

Frankly, the standards applicable

to Judges in motions to recuse seems to be far greater than
standards that were applied to arbitrators.

If it would apply

such to Judge, it certainly would apply with greater force to
an arbitrator.
So we still -- no matter what happens, we get back
to the central issue, was there a close personal relationship
between George Burbidge and Richard Burbidge?
The evidence is clear.

There was not.

There is nothing but a presumption,

which is clearly now packed and behind us; and therefore
there's no basis for a vacation.
THE COURT: Okay.
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MR. HUMPHREYS: Now, if I may, your Honor, I'd like to

2

address the Court's questions, unless you have questions about

3

what I just argued?

4

THE COURT: I don't,

5

MR. HUMPHREYS: The Court has raised some questions,

6

and I will now address, first of all, who won; what were the

7

facts; how does —

8

award for purpose of determining prevailing party.

9

how does the Court interpret the arbitration

Though this has been addressed, I think we need

10

to maybe get a better focus on it.

11

arbitration award, which is attached as exhibits to both memos,

12

I think we have three different copies of that arbitration

13

award attached.

14

If you will look at the

On page 4, the arbitrators state there were 208

15

claimants -- claimant couples.

16

collectively.

17

had been actually injured, and they awarded the $500 for the

18

lost trip, for each of the 131.

19

They treat the couples

Out of those 208, they found on page 8, 131

Now, as Counsel correctly stated, the real fight in

20

this case has always been liability.

21

effort, and time, expense went into this, was establishing

22

liability.

23

That's where all of the

All three arbitrators, including Judge Billings

24

and Paul Felt —

25

Mr. Burbidge out of the picture, we still have a majority,

and by the way, even if we were to take

-45including the arbitrator who was appointed by Westgate, who
have determined that there was fraud, there was unlawful
activity.
They had gone very carefully in multiple page findings
of fact and conclusions of law, and carefully outlined all of
the facts that support each element of the unlawful pattern
excuse me, pattern of unlawful activity.

They have —

—

that was

the major part of the battle.
Now, the Court, I am sure, is raising the question on
the —

because both sides have asked for attorney's fees as it

relates to this proceeding.

Now, I think the Court needs to

appreciate that the awarding of attorney's fees is a different
basis here than it is in the arb —

with the arbitrators.

That

has not been decided yet by the arbitrators.
Now, the reason why is because the award is for the
necessity of having to bring it to the Court and to create a
judgment.

It's not for the purpose of trying to figure out

who did what in the underlying arbitration, and who won what
and who —

what defenses were won or lost, or what claims were.
It has solely to do with the issue of does the winning

party, which Westgate clearly was, as Counsel has conceded

—

MS. PORTER: CPG.
MR. HUMPHREYS: —

CPG

—

THE COURT: CPG.
MR. HUMPHREYS: —

clearly was, as Westgate's Counsel
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has conceded,

2

MR. EPSTEIN: I'll stipulate the other way.

3

MS. PORTER: No.

4

MR. EPSTEIN: (Inaudible).

5

MR. HUMPHREYS: But CPG has had to bring the motion

6

to confirm the award, because of non-payment; and that is the

7

basis and the predicate for awarding of attorney's fees.

8

hasn't got anything to do with what amount was not paid or

9

awarded by the arbitrators.

That is an issue before the

10

arbitrators when they decide how attorney's fees should be

11

awarded in the underlying arbitration.

12

It

Furthermore, I think it's important to point out,

13

your Honor, that the percentage —

14

punitive damages, nor double damages; and I'll explain why.

15

We made it very clear to the arbitrators that the punitive

16

damages had been awarded in the trail before this Court; and

17

in that process there was consideration of many, if not all of

18

the various claimants.

19

well, CPG did not ask for

Therefore it would be wrong to ask for double damages,

20

which the statute allows for finding under the pattern of

21

unlawful activity statute.

22

damages here, and yet claim punitive damages here in this

23

before this Court.

It would be wrong to ask for double
—

24

So we told the arbitrators that CPG -was not seeking

25

any punitive compensation or award at all in the arbitration
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because of the punitive damage judgment here.

2

reason —

3
4

So that's one

or that's another element the Court should consider.
All right, let me now address some of the comments

made by Counsel as it relates to the question the Court raised;

5. Burbidge is not a common name, would a reasonable party invest6

igate or at least look at and make reasonable inquiry, was

7

there an affirmative duty on Westgate?

8
9

It's interesting that when Westgate argues that
there was no such affirmative duty, they would —

it would be

10

unreasonable to suggest such a duty to discover; and why would

11

anyone look at the letterhead to find that?

12

head saying, "Well, how did they find it?"

13

looking at our letterhead after the award.

14

I'm scratching my
They found it by

It's very clear, Mr. Marder said that just before

15

the motion for attorney's fees was heard, after the award had

16

been made, and findings of fault and wrongful conduct had been

17

made, he said, "The night before that hearing I happened to be

18

looking at a letterhead and I saw Burbidge" -- or not the night

19

before, within a few days before.

20

So I contacted Mr. Humphreys.

21

wasn't certain, so I contacted George Burbidge.

22

the night before and said there is —

23

there's no relationship," and I spelled out some of the facts.

24
25

I wanted to know —

I

I then emailed

"They are cousins, but

Now, I'm scratching my head, saying, if there's no
reason for them to look at it at the commencement.

Why was
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there a reason to look at it after the adverse finding?

2

there was —

3

clear that you wouldn't have to ever consider that there would

4

be such a relationship because you assumed the party -- or

5

the parties and/or the arbitrators were disclosed, I'm just

6

scratching my head saying, *Well, then how did we get where we

7

are?"

if it was so hard, and the assumptions were so

Clearly they did have notice of the letterhead.

8
9

If

When there is no indication at all by the parties
about who they're going to be appointing and what relationship

10

there is, I mean, heavens, I could have disclosed that I know

11

Richard Burbidge, too.

12

him?

13

him, against him.

Yes.

14

He's not a cousin.

Have I been with him?

Yes.

Have I been against

I've had cases with

Have I gone to lunch with him?

Yes.

Now, is that the kind of thing that I'm required

15

under the statute to disclose?

16

of relationship I have with all attorneys, including Mr. Felt

17

and Judge Billings, though I hadn't ever been to lunch with

18

her except during the arbitration, when we had lunch together.

19

Everyone had lunch together, not just me.

20

clear.

21

No, because that is the kind

I need to make that

So I think that we're in a very different situation.

22

Clearly Westgate had stipulated to the appointment by each

23

party of one arbitrator.

24

on that.

25

to arbitrate, we suggested to the Court, and we discussed

Now, I say-- let me give a background

In the order where the Judge granted their motion

-491 I with Counsel that procedure of having each party select one
2 I arbitrator, and have those two select a third.

It was agreed

3 I upon by both sides.
4 I

The Court didn't decide that out of the blue, and come

5 I up with that.

That was something that was discussed between

6 I Counsel, and we both agreed.
7 I —

our arbitrator first.

8 I do so.

In fact, we designated our first

The Court gave us 20 days in which to

Westgate requested an extension of that, because who

9 I they were looking at, which ended up being Judge Billings, was
10 I out of town or something.

We

—

11

MR. EPSTEIN: No, she was still serving.

12

THE COURT: She was still serving.

13

MR. HUMPHREYS: Oh, you're right.

14 I

MR. EPSTEIN: She got continued over, because

15

MR. HUMPHREYS: There it is.

16 I

MR. EPSTEIN: -- you apparently —

17 I hate to interrupt, but it

Yourre right.

I --

—

you may remember.

—

18

THE COURT: I do.

19 I

MR. EPSTEIN: - - was an i n t e r e s t i n g s t o r y , where her

2 0 I replacement was r e j e c t e d .

So she ended up having t o work

2 1 I overtime, i f you w i l l .
22 I

MR. HUMPHREYS: T h a t ' s

right.

23

THE COURT: My u n d e r s t a n d i n g —

24

MR. EPSTEIN: T h a t ' s what i t was.

25

THE COURT: — i t was r e j e c t e d by t h e

--

I
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MR. HUMPHREYS: You have refreshed my memory on it.

2

THE COURT: —

3

MR. EPSTEIN: By the Senate.

4

THE COURT: -- chosen by —

5

by the Senate, chosen by

—

selected by the Governor,

but rejected ultimately by the Senate.

6

MR. EPSTEIN: Exactly so.

7

THE COURT: And a withdrawal.

8

MR. EPSTEIN: And a very unusual scenario.

9

MR. HUMPHREYS: Okay, so in any event, this was not a

10

situation where the parties had not say in how the arbitrators

11

would have been selected.

12

Now, one final comment —

oh, by the way, let me

13

finish the questions the Judge raised.

14

recitation of the parties' positions and arguments, we're

15

satisfied the Court accurately addressed those in preliminary

16

statement.

17

As it related to your

The Court during Westgate's argument raised the

18

question of what about costs paid to the arbitrators?

19

may be worthwhile, your Honor, to note that each party has

20

paid $75,000 to the arbitrators.

21

but it is not inexpensive.

22

sides to employ the three arbitrators, all of —

23

of which charged I think a collective rate of $350 an hour.

24

Now, maybe not all of that $150,000 has been used.

25

think the last accounting indicated there was approximately

It

Arbitration may be speedy,

It was a huge expense for both
all three

I
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20,000 that had not yet been used by the arbitrators, but still

2

held in trust; but we still have pending matters.

3

aure whether we're going to see anything or have a bill at the

4

end for additional tine.

5

So we're not

Those are significant costs; but those costs are

6

issues to be awarded and decided by the arbitrators, not this

7

Court, again, because I think this Court is limited to the

8

attorney's fees and expenses associated with that.

9
10

THE COURT: I asked the question because potentially
the issue of attorney's fees could exceed the award.

11

MR. HUMPHREYS: Right, that's

12

THE COURT: —

13

you know, not the attorney's fees issue

of the award, but could exceed the award; could it not?
MR. HUMPRHEYS: You mean, before

15

THE COURT: I mean

16

MR. HUMPHREYS: —

18

—

—
this Court or the arbitrators'

attorney's fees?
THE COURT: Between —

before the arbitrators.

I mean,

19

if you each paid $75,000 to the arbitrators, and you get an

20

award of $65,000.

21
22

—

—

14

17

Not

MR. HUMPHREYS: The costs alone will exceed the award.
There's no doubt about that.

23

THE COURT: Yeah.

24

MR. HUMPHREYS: And the claim for attorney's fees, as

25

Counsel has argued, is —
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THE COURT: Still.

2

MR. HUMPHREYS: —

3

MR. EPSTEIN: Yes.

4

MR. HUMPHREYS: That's not uncommon in civil rights

many times that amount.

5

cases.

6

whole issue is attorney's fees, and the ultimate finding by

7

the Court of whether there was a violation of civil rights or

8

something such as that.

9

but your observation is correct.

10

Oftentimes there's very little compensation, but the

So that's an not uncommon situation,

All right, now on a final note, may I suggest this.

11

Mestgate has made a big issue of the fact that arbitrator

12

Burbidge was neutral —

13

All three were.

14

definition of neutral, meaning someone has -- is independent

15

of everything, like a Judge would be in our case, or a jury

16

would be in our case.

17

the, quote, "neutral arbitrator."

In so arguing, they have used the general

The statute is not clear exactly what it meant by "the

18

neutral arbitrator;" but the Section 112, which I also gave to

19

the Court, does ref —

20

subsection (b).

21

(2)?

22

agreements and procedures, and what happens if there's no

23

agreement and the Court has to decide.

24
25

again identify a neutral arbitrator in

In subsection -- or did I —

Let me look.

or should I say

Subsection (a) of 112 talks in terras of

So -- but it doesn't define who the neutral arbitrator
is; but it's very clear when you read the text of the statute.
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that a neutral arbitrator is someone different.

2

arbitrator.

3

you read it that way, or when you look at it, this issue, is

4

that party appointed arbitrators aren't the neutral arbitrator.

5

Only the —

6

the two Court appointed arbitrators, or if there'3 a procedure

7

in place agreed in the agreement that outlines who it's going

8

to be that's independent of the parties' choice, then that

9

person becomes a neutral.

10

It's not any

I think the only reading that makes any sense when

an arbitrator either chosen by the Court, chosen by

So I think it is an improper assumption to say that

11

every arbitrator is a neutral, or you get absurd results;

12

because if that isn't the case, then by definition you are

13

having arbitration awards by partial non-neutral arbitrators.

14

That is not —

15

neutral, and apply it to everybody.

16

you can't stretch the general definition of

There has to be a reason why they are using the word

17

"neutral arbitrator."

18

is a designating arbitrator, as a person who is not party

19

appointed.

20

It's not so much a descriptive as it

That is the mechanism that is neutral.

It is not necessarily the neutrality of the state of

21

mind of the arbitrator, if you were to do it.

22

arbitration would be subject to attack, suggesting that they

23

weren't neutral, or they were Court appoint —

24

appointed.

25

the plaintiff's Counsel.

Otherwise, every

excuse me, party

Therefore they had some tie with the plaintiffs, or
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So I think a fair reading restricts the meaning of the

2

statute to either Court appointed or a non-party appointed

3

arbitrator as being the neutral.

4

THE COURT: Okay.

5

MR. HUMPHREYS: Thank you.

6

THE COURT: Mr. Epstein.

7

MR. EPSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor.

8

the arbitrator's choice —

9

would more consider it their obligation —

This is where

if you want to call it a choice.

I

to invoke and abide

10

by the triple A code of arbitration, arbitrator ethics, becomes

11

much more important.

12

As we pointed out, as the Court is aware, in the award

13

itself, the arbitrators, all three of them, said they'd govern

14

themselves by the Arbitrator Code of Ethics. What Mr. Humphreys

15

just argued now underscores something that we really didn't

16

argue at all.

17

fact this is true, if in fact that because of the way the

18

arbitrators were appointed, that Mr, Burbidge would not be

19

considered a neutral, under the Utah Arbitration Act, that it

20

is absolutely clear now, by virtue of Mr. Humphreys' construct

21

that Mr. Burbidge has committed a serious offense and violation

22

of the triple A Code of Arbitration Ethics.

23

Maybe it was in a footnote, I think, that if in

THE COURT: Well, so has your arbitrator, the one that

24

you designated, simply by virtue of that —

25

the neutrality issue is a designation -- a specific designation

all he's saying is
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in the statute.

2

MR. EPSTEIN: Our -- we have never taken the position,

3

nor do I believe has Judge Billings ever taken the position

4

that she was anythingf but neuitral un der every interpretation

5

or cons truction of that term.

6

THE COURT: Well, hopefully so; but the fact of the

7

matter is that he —

8

you give parties an opportunity to select an arbitrator, okay,

9

and that those two arbitrators are then going to designate a

10

let me just state on the record.

When

third, it may be someone that they've worked with before

11

MR. EPSTEIN: Sure.

12

THE COURT: —

—

they've had on panels before, they

13

recognize their professionality, they recognize their back-

14

ground, they recognize their experience, they recognize perhaps

15

their past judicial positions or appellate positions, or et

16

cetera.

17

So they take all of that into account.
I don't think an arbitrator under those circumstances

18

has to say, "Listen, for the last 15 years I have arbitrated

19

the following cases in connection with attorneys out of that

20

firm, and here are all of the decisions that have been made in

21 I connection with that," that type of thing; be causei
22 1 you know

I

think

—

I think that the opportunity based upon the Court

23

order to ma Ice a designation is an independent desi gnation on

24

the part of both parties.

25

MR . EPSTEIN: Well, I

—
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THE COURT: Keep going.

2

MR. EPSTEIN: No, I agree with you entirely.

3

saying anything different-

4

inherent in the process --

We're not

Those kinds of relationships are

5

THE COURT: Sure.

6

MR. EPSTEIN: -- and we're not suggesting that that has

7

been a problem here at all.

8

pointing to here --

9

The only relationship that we're

THE COURT: Is the familial.

10

MR. EPSTEIN: —

is the familial one.

So the fact that

11

we knew one another, we assumed, and rightly so.

12

of us assumed that either Judge Billings or Richard Burbidge

13

knew Paul Felt.

14

would have a problem with it.

15

works,

16

Fine.

I think all

We wouldn't expect that they —

anybody

I think we all know how that

Here now is where all of this leads.

The arbitrators

17

themselves who now have charged themselves with knowledge of

18

all of the provisions of the triple A Code of Arbitration

19

Ethics now under Mr. Humphreys' construct, CPG's construct,

20

now Mr. Burbidge must deal with Canon (I), Canon (I)(X)f which

21

speaks precisely to this scenario.

22

Sub (a), "In some types of arbitration in which there

23

are three arbitrators, it is customary for each party acting

24

alone to appoint one arbitrator.

25

appointed by agreement either of the parties, or of the two

The third arbitrator is then

-571 I arbitrators," precisely what we have here, *or avail in such
2 J agreement by an independent institution or individual," which
3 I we didn't have.
4 J

"In tri-party arbitrations to which this covenant

5 I applies," and it does apply because the arbitrators made
6 I it apply, "all three arbitrators are presumed to be neutral
7 I and are expected to observe the same standards as the third
8

arbitrator,"

9 I

So Mr. Burbidge under Mr. —

under CPG's construct,

10 I now must fit himself into this provision, which means that he
11 I had the same obligation to make disclosures as Mr. Felt did.
12 I

Then I go on, me, "Notwithstanding this presumption,

13 I there are certain types of tri-party arbitration in which it
14 I is expected by all parties that the two arbitrators appointed
15 j by the parties may be predisposed toward the party appointing

16 I them.
"Those arbitrators referred to in this code as xCanon

17 I
18 IX'" —

Canon Roman Numeral X -- "'arbitrators are not to be held

19 I to the standards of neutrality and independence applicable to
20 I the other arbitrators.

Canon X describes the special ethical

21 I obligations of party appointed arbitrators who are not expected
22

to meet the standard of neutrality."

Now, we don't believe

23 J that that occurred here, but that's Mr. (Inaudible) construct.
24 J

W

C) A party appointed arbitrator has an obligation to

25 I ascertain as early as possible, but not later than the first

-581

meeting of the arbitrators and the parties, whether the parties

2

have agreed that the party-appointed arbitrators will serve as

3

neutrals, or whether they shall be subject to Canon X; and to

4

provide a timely report of their conclusions to the parties and

5

other arbitrators.

6

Now --

7

THE COURT: Well, yeah, and we go back to the "required

8

by an agreement to be neutral" language, right?

9

MR. EPSTEIN: Well, in the fee agreement which preceded

10

that first meeting, declared themselves to be neutral.

11

party agree —

12

word.

13

Mr. Burbidge in fact did comply with the code of ethics by

14

declaring himself to be neutral prior to the first meeting,

15

the first scheduling conference that we had.

16

arbitrators, but neutral in this sense of the

So Mr. Burbidge —

contrary to what CPG is arguing,

So CPG's argument falls of its own weight, by virtue

17

of what their own arbitrator in fact did.

18

choice.

19

said, "I'm not a neutral --A>

20
21

He had two paths.

Mr. Burbidge had a

In the fee agreement he could have

THE COURT: No, only —

only part of their argument,

not their entire argument.

22

MR. EPSTEIN: No, no, no, the last part.

23

THE COURT: Yeah.

24

MR. EPSTEIN: The last part that Mr. —

25

Not

had articulated.

Mr. Humphreys

That last part falls of its own weight,
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because if Mr. Burbidge was not going to be anything other than

2

the classic archetypal neutral arbitrator, he had an obligation

3

to inform the parties prior to the first scheduling conference

4

that he would be subject to the Canon X disclosures, okay?

5

Now, he didn't do that, so he's not subject to the

6

Canon X disclosures.

7

disclosures, which we've talked about a lot, which basically

8

mirror the disclosures in Section 113 of the Utah arbitration

9

code.

10

He's actually subject to the Canon I

Let's also look at what Canon X requires, because

11

this is where the CPG argument again fails.

12

Canon X arbitrators are expected to observe all of the ethical

13

obligations prescribed by this code, except those from which

14

they are specifically excused; a) obligations of a Canon I.

15

That's a disclosure.

16

of the obligations of Canon I subject only to the following

17

provisions," and there's a couple of exceptions.

"Canon X requires

Canon X arbitrators should observe all

18

Bottom line, it keeps referring back.

19

Canon X arbitrators are still required to disclose what

20

is involved in this case, even if they were a non-neutral

21

arbitrator.

22

himself

Again, CPG's argument fails because Mr. Burbidge

—

23

THE COURT: Declared.

24

MR. EPSTEIN: —

25

In our view,

excluded himself, declared himself

to be a neutral arbitrator early on in the procedure, and
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therefore subject to all of the provisions of the code, and

2

also subject to the -- all of the provisions imposed upon a

3

neutral arbitrator under the Utah Arbitration Act.

4

Now, the primary thrust of CPG' s argument is that a

5

reasonable person is not likely -- I don't want to rais-phrase

6

this —

7

familial relationship likely to affect the impartiality

8

of the arbitrator in the arbitration proceeding.

9

precisely why I made my observations at the beginning of this.

10

that a reasonable person would not consider this

This is

Mr. Humphreys' argument is a greater argument by a

11

great lawyer.

12

client.

13

your mind?

14

he could possibly make money on this.

15

I'm a reasonable client.

It is not an argument that will be made by his

His client would say, ^Wait a second.

Are you out of

This guy's cousin is in that firm over there, and
I'd want to know that.

I'm entitled to know that."

16

We have to now take ourselves outside the shoes, you

17

know, that we're wearing, you know, that are the byproduct of

18

20 or 30 or longer years of being lawyers, and being skeptical,

19

you know, and cynical about many -- too many things, and put

20

ourselves in the shoes of a person who is just basically

21

innocently believing that these proc -- that this process is

22

not susceptible to these kinds of involvements, without them at

23

least knowing about it.

24

So I think we are missing the point of the statute

25

by saying that -- just declaring as a matter of law that no
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reasonable person would think this likely to affect the

2

impartiality.
The only way that one could ever determine whether it

3
4

would likely affect the impartiality of the arbitrator is to

5

do what Westgate was denied the ability to do; and that is to

6

investigate before determining whether it was likely to affect

7

the impartiality.
Again, you draw the conclusion, and then you go back

8
9

and sayr ^Because I've already drawn this conclusion, you no

10

longer have the right to even ask the question."

11

flaw in the argument.

12

is making the decision as to whether Westgate would be likely

13

to consider this to be important, and then at the same time

14

whether to disclose it in the first instance.

15

That's the

Is it the same person, Richard Burbidge,

You've got a self-contained little operation here.

16

Is it the same person who has to make the disclosure, gets to

17

decide whether to make the disclosure by determining them own

18

—

19

some other person who they most clearly are not.

20

their own selves whether this is likely to be important to

Nobody else has come in here and said -- other than
and said that nThis isn't likely to affect

21

Richard Burbidge —

22

my impartiality."

23

person contemplated by the statute.

24

contemplated by the statute is not a reasonable person serving

25

as an arbitrator, but a reasonable person serving as a parti-

Mr. Burbidge is certainly not the reasonable
The reasonable person
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cipant, as a party in the arbitration process.

2

That's where their argument, again, fails of its

3

own weight.

4

consider this important.

5

Burbidge himself didn't consider it important, because -- I

6

won't say he's estranged from his cousin, but certainly there

7

seems to be elements of that.

8
9

They can't say that a reasonable party wouldn't
They're only saying that Richard

That's missing the point.
decision.

He doesn't get to make that

The party gets to make that decision; and the party

10

here was denied its absolute right under the statute to make

11

that decision.

12

It's a circular argument.

It's a totality, in essence; and it completely guts

13

the obligation to disclose, if you give the party who ha -- the

14

arbitrator who has that obligation the right to evaluate the

15

meaningfulness of the disclosure in the first instance.

16

the point of disclosure if you're going to give the arbitrator

17

the right to vet what they have to disclose?

18

What's

That totally renders the entire disclosure process

19

meaningless, when it is always going to be through the filter

20

of the arbitrator.

21

Nothing in the code of ethics, nothing in the comments to the

22

Uniform Arbitration Code, nothing suggests that there ought to

23

be some sort of test applied by the arbitrator themselves as to

24

whether this is worthy of disclosure or not, based upon their

25

own view or vision.

This is unfiltered, unvarnished disclosure.

-63THE COURT: That's what we do all the time.

1

2

what Judges do all the time

That's

—

3

MR. EPSTEIN: That's what Judges do.

4

THE COURT: —

as it relates to the issues of recusal.

5

We make a threshold determination whether —

6

it in terms of liberality relative to the issue of potential

7

conflict, and bring it up.

8

years ago.

9

this —

I don't care whether it's 25 or 30

I brought one up two weeks ago that I represented

this client on a collection case under $250 35 years

10

ago.

11

that issue, and that's what they did.

12

and I always do

Now, parties can make a determination as it relates to

MR. EPSTEIN: Your Honor, if I may, and this is not

13

intended to be impertinent, but you weren't told by one of the

14

parties, "Wait a second, 35 years ago you represented me."

15

disclosed that to them.

16

THE COURT: I did disclose it.

17

MR. EPSTEIN: You brought it up.

18

THE COURT: But

19

MR. EPSTEIN: That's the way it's supposed to work.

20

THE COURT: Yeah, but let's say there was a failure

You

—

21

to disclose as it related to that issue when we proceeded,

22

and then there happened to be a judgment against one party or

23

another, and someone determined at some stage that 35 years ago

24

in private case I had a very minor case, a simple collection

25

letter case in connection with one of the parties.

Is that a

-64basis upon which they can move to then set aside a judgment in
the case, or a jury, or whatever it may be?

My goodness.

MR. EPSTEIN: The question is the reasonableness of
the belief of the party that the Court was somehow biased or
prejudiced or influenced by that fact.
of that belief.

It's the reasonableness

You don't go back and question whether it is

in fact true or not.
Remember, when you're asked to recuse yourself, you're
not making a determination of whether you are or not biased or
prejudiced.

You're making an evaluation about whether the

party has made an adequate showing of a reasonable belief that
the Court may be biased or prejudiced.

That belief can only be

established by knowing what the facts are.

You're never going

to put yourself in the shoes of the individual party, and say,
M

Your belief is unreasonable," you know.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. EPSTEIN: You have to evaluate it from a different

standard; and here -THE COURT: Okay, let's just wrap up.
MR. EPSTEIN: —

that's not the standard.

THE COURT: You followed up on my question.
MR. EPSTEIN: Okay, let me just -- I've got my notes
here.

If I could make, you know, another comment.

debating this issue of the letterhead.
into this —

We're

I think all of us fall

this little trap of kind of forgetting about how
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we actually operate every single day, how much paper goes

2

through our desk.

3

The Court, you've told us before, there's no way, and

4

you know there's no way, that you're looking at and studying

5

every word on every page of every piece of paper that is in

6

front of you.

7

surplusage, you look at the important stuff, you (inaudible) .

8

The fact of the matter is, Mr. Marder said it I think

9

very well, he had never really looked at their letterhead, and

You know what's important, you know what is

10

he just happened to catch it, and see, wait a second, because

11

we had such a huge volume of email, huge volume of email.

12

course, that doesn't have any of that kind of specifics.

13

mean, it's not right or wrong.

14

You know, I don't —

Of
I

It just happens to be true.
I don't —

you know, again, I

15

think it's irrelevant, because it now presupposes there's

16

some sort of duty to investigate, and some sort of inquiry

17

notice, which we've already argued, I think, you know, I think

18

very strenuously that there is none.

19

disclosure process on its head; but again, that's the way it

20

is in real life, and I think Rich can really appreciate that as

21

well.

That turns the whole

22

THE COURT: Okay, thank you, Counsel.

23

MR. EPSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor.

24

THE COURT: It's 10 minutes to 5.

25

day.

It's been a long

I frankly had anticipated that I would announce the
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decision from the bench today; but it involves an articulation

2

relative to the issues of the applicable statutes, et cetera,

3

in some great detail.

4

one way or the other, and I think it ought to be in writing.

5

I'll do that within a period of 60 days.

6

again, Counsel.

The decision, frankly, may be appealed

7

MR. EPSTEIN: Always, your Honor.

8

THE COURT: Nice to —

9

(Hearing concluded)

Nice to see you

Thank you.

nice to have you here.
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Via email and U.S. Mail
Richard W. Epstein
Rebecca F. Bratter
GreenspoonMarder, P.A.
Trade Center South, Suite 700
100 West Cypress Creek Road
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309-2140
Todd Shaughnessy
David P. Williams
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Re:

Consumer Protection Group v. Westgate Resorts Ltd
Your File No. 00108.1230
Our File No. SADELA9417

Dear Counsel:
Pursuant to the court's order regarding arbitration, Coasunier Protection Group hereby
appoints as an arbitrator, Richard D, Burbidge of Burbidge Mitchell & Gross, 215 South State
Street, Suite 920, Salt Lake City, UT 8411T
We will look forward to the name of the arbitrator appointed by Westgate. We
understand that those two will then appoint the third arbitrator. Once appointed^ I will prepare a

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
Re. Consumer Protection v. We.stgaie
November 26.2008
Page 2

statement of claim that i wiJI submit to them. You can then respond. We can then have a
scheduling conference to determine dates and parameters of discovery.
Sincerely yours,
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

L Rich Humpherys,

Cc Richard D. Burbidge

